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DEFERRING TO SECRECY 
Margaret B. Kwoka* 
Abstract: In prescribing de novo judicial review of agencies’ decisions to 
withhold requested information from the public under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), Congress deliberately and radically departed 
from the typical deferential treatment courts are required to give to agen-
cies. Nonetheless, empirical studies demonstrate that the de novo review 
standard on the books in FOIA cases is not the standard used in practice. 
In fact, despite being subject to the stringent de novo standard, agencies’ 
FOIA decisions are upheld at a substantially higher rate than agency deci-
sions that are entitled to deferential review. This Article posits that al-
though courts recite the appropriate standard in FOIA cases, they have 
created a collection of practices unique to FOIA cases that have the effect 
of deferring to the government’s secrecy positions. First, in some cases, 
courts expressly defer to particular representations made by the govern-
ment, even though these representations are themselves crucial to the 
overall determination of the legality of the withholding. Second, in every 
FOIA case, certain procedural practices have become part of the body of 
case law governing how FOIA cases are adjudicated, and these practices 
stack the deck in favor of the government. This Article concludes that 
these procedural practices, which are departures from the federal proce-
dural system’s trans-substantive design, may be the more pernicious of the 
deference doctrines under FOIA, as they hide the true nature of the rul-
ings, make it more difficult for the political branches to respond, and di-
minish public confidence in the judiciary. 
Introduction 
 Administrative agencies are charged with carrying out the vast ma-
jority of business of the federal government. Their activities range from 
promulgating regulations,1 to adjudicating individual claims for bene-
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fits,2 to providing public works and services,3 to licensing the rights to 
engage in various activities,4 and beyond. Almost every agency decision 
affects the public in some perceptible way. As a result, the legitimacy, 
correctness, and lawfulness of nearly every agency action has the poten-
tial to be the subject of a lawsuit. 
 Despite the availability of judicial review for most agency decisions, 
almost all agency actions are entitled to deference from the courts.5 
Rationales for deference to agency actions include agency expertise in 
the subject matter of the decision, a desire to avoid courts duplicating 
the efforts of the agency, and the concern, rooted in the separation of 
powers, that courts not unduly interfere with the political branches of 
government.6 Moreover, deference to the agencies is not limited to 
their findings of fact; unlike appellate review of trial court decisions 
that do not arise from agencies, courts reviewing agency actions typi-
cally defer to the agency’s position even on questions of law.7 
 In stark contrast to the vast majority of standards of judicial review 
applied in administrative law, judges are required to exercise de novo 
review over agency decisions to withhold government records under 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).8 The legislative histories of 
the standards of review articulated in FOIA and the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) demonstrate that Congress acted deliberately.9 As 
one scholar put it, “It is doubtful that Congress wants scope of review to 
be an irrelevant labeling exercise.”10 A FOIA withholding is different 
from other agency actions in important ways: it is one of the few admin-
istrative actions in which the agency’s own illegitimate self-interest is 
often at stake, it is uniquely about the public’s oversight right over the 
                                                                                                                      
2 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 421(b) (2006) (providing for a hearing before the Social Security 
Administration regarding entitlement to social security disability benefits). 
3 The services offered by government are too numerous to catalog reasonably, but they 
include, of course, national security, public works projects, subsidies, and many more. See 
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Fiscal Year 2013 Budget of the U.S. Government (2012). 
4 For example, the Federal Communications Commission licenses the rights to broad-
cast television and radio stations. See Licensing, Fed. Comm. Commission, http://www.fcc. 
gov/topic/licensing (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
5 See infra notes 25–50 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 51–78 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 25–50 and accompanying text. 
8 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
9 See infra notes 79–105 and accompanying text. 
10 Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 679, 682 (2002). 
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administrative state, and Congress intended judges to act as protectors 
of the public interest.11 
 Despite Congress’s clear intentions, commentators have observed 
that judicial review of agency FOIA decisions is less than vigorous.12 
Most notably, Professor Paul Verkuil’s empirical study suggests that 
FOIA requesters who challenge denials in court fail to get the benefit 
of the searching review provided for by Congress.13 He reports a ninety 
percent affirmance rate in FOIA cases, which is higher than the affir-
mance rate for comparable administrative decisions supposedly re-
viewed with greater deference.14 Verkuil labels judicial review of FOIA 
decisions “anemic,” and attributes this outcome to a “black box of inar-
ticulate factors” that influence courts’ decision making.15 
 Others have suggested various subjective motives that might un-
derlie judicial decisions in this area, including hostility to FOIA as a 
transparency tool, unsympathetic plaintiffs, and overconfidence in the 
government’s assessments of harms associated with releasing docu-
ments such as those related to national security.16 Rather than probe 
judges’ subjective intentions or motivations, this Article theorizes a sys-
tem of judicial practices that amount to deferential treatment and ac-
count for the astronomical affirmance rate, and in so doing, fills in a 
portion of the “black box” of judicial decision making in FOIA cases. 
This Article posits that, contrary to Congress’s purpose, the judiciary 
                                                                                                                      
11 See infra notes 106–119 and accompanying text. 
12 See generally Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role That Courts Should Play in Pre-
venting Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 131 (2006) (arguing that courts overly defer 
to agencies’ national security claims); Verkuil, supra note 10 (evaluating the affirmance 
rate in FOIA cases, reviewed under a de novo standard, as compared with the affirmance 
rate in Social Security disability cases, which are reviewed under a deferential standard); 
Nathan Slegers, Comment, De Novo Review Under the Freedom of Information Act: The Case 
Against Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions to Withhold Information, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 209 
(2006) (noting various instances in which courts expressly depart from the de novo stan-
dard of review prescribed in the statute). 
13 Verkuil, supra note 10, at 730. As Verkuil states, “The challenge is to make district 
judges more curious about these cases so that they might look behind agency affidavits.” Id. 
14 Id. at 706, 713 (reporting an approximately ten percent reversal rate in FOIA cases 
during the ten-year period from 1990 to 1999, which was “closer to the hypothesized arbi-
trary and capricious standard” and fell far below the over fifty percent reversal rate in So-
cial Security disability cases). 
15 Id. at 718. 
16 See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 12, at 163 (describing courts’ reluctance “to probe agency 
explanations” for withholding national security information); James T. O’Reilly, “Access to 
Records” Versus “Access to Evil:” Should Disclosure Laws Consider Motives as a Barrier to Records 
Release?, 12 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 559, 567 (2003) (arguing that the particular requester’s 
motives factor into judicial decision making about release); Verkuil, supra note 10, at 715–
16 (citing courts’ “skepticism” toward FOIA, if not “resistance”). 
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has created a de facto system of deference in its judicial review of FOIA 
cases, while continuing to pay lip service to the de novo standard of 
review articulated in the statute. This deference is two-pronged. First, in 
some instances, the judiciary expressly has adopted doctrines of defer-
ence for particular types of secrecy decisions, not rooted in statutory or 
other authority, based on its own view of the correct decisionmaker in a 
given context.17 Second, courts have adopted procedural maneuvers 
unique to FOIA cases that frustrate challenges to agencies’ secrecy de-
cisions.18 
 Part I demonstrates that Congress made a deliberate and reasoned 
choice to require courts to engage in a more critical review of FOIA de-
cisions than other agency actions.19 Part II surveys the empirical evi-
dence on the effect of the standard of review on the outcomes of admin-
istrative cases.20 It documents that FOIA’s affirmance rate is an outlier 
that cannot be explained by existing theories of litigation outcomes.21 
Part III explains the gap between FOIA’s stringent standard of review 
and high affirmance rate by theorizing a system of substantive and pro-
cedural deference that results in approval of agency secrecy decisions in 
FOIA cases.22 Part IV argues that not only is the courts’ failure to respect 
the congressionally chosen standard of review troubling, but also that 
the courts’ use of procedural devices to achieve that outcome poses par-
ticular problems for judicial transparency, public response, and the 
courts’ legitimacy.23 Finally, Part V concludes by providing potential re-
sponses to the courts’ deference to secrecy.24 
I. Purposeful Congressional Choice 
A. Standards of Review of Agency Actions 
 Judicial review of most agency actions is governed by the APA.25 
Although statutes specific to agencies or particular agency actions may 
provide otherwise,26 the APA establishes default judicial review stan-
                                                                                                                      
17 See infra notes 168–223 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 224–313 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 25–119 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 120–165 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 120–165 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 166–313 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 314–340 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 341–353 and accompanying text. 
25 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006). 
26 See, e.g., Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 Tex. L. 
Rev. 499, 507–09 (2011). 
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dards providing that courts may review agency actions and set aside any 
findings or conclusions that are: 
  (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-
erwise not in accordance with law; 
  (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or 
immunity; 
  (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limita-
tions, or short of statutory right; 
  (D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
  (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject 
to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on 
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or 
  (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts 
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.27 
These seemingly straightforward standards have produced more confu-
sion than clarity,28 and determining how to apply these standards of 
review has generated lengthy and hair-splitting decisions.29 
 The default standards operate differently depending on whether 
the question before the court is one of fact, law, or discretion.30 By way 
of comparison, in the context of appellate review of trial court (rather 
than agency) decisions, facts found by a district court are reviewed for 
clear error by a court of appeals, discretionary decisions are reviewed 
for an abuse of that discretion, and legal questions are reviewed de 
                                                                                                                      
27 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
28 See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 Va. L. Rev. 135, 153 (2010). 
29 See David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 525, 530 (2011) (noting 
that it has “never been easy for courts to distinguish between questions of law, questions of 
fact, and mixed questions of law and fact, subsequently apply the right standard of review, 
and then finally perform a catchall review for arbitrariness”). 
30 As I describe the various standards that apply, I attempt only to describe the formal 
standards and their basic applications to show that the vast majority of administrative deci-
sions are reviewed deferentially. I do not contend that all of these standards are different 
from one another in practice. Nor do I contend that these standards are clear in their 
application or justified either by the APA or administrative common law. I note only that 
the literature raises serious doubts about all of those questions. See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman, 
End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should 
Be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779, 782–84 (2010) (arguing that the judicial standard of 
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, stemming from the 1984 Su-
preme Court case, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, is unjustified, has unduly complicated judi-
cial review, and has failed to effectuate its purpose); Zaring, supra note 28, at 166–67 (pos-
iting that the differing standards, in practice, amount to the same level of review). 
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novo.31 These familiar standards are founded on the precept that the 
district court is in the best position to view the evidence, find facts, and 
employ the most just exercise of discretion, whereas courts of appeals 
specialize in answering legal questions and unifying the law.32 As a re-
sult, appellate courts do not defer to trial courts on questions of law, 
but they do review findings of fact and discretionary decisions under 
these deferential standards. 
 Although agencies face tasks analogous to those of district courts, 
appellate courts reviewing agency decisions treat agency decisions dif-
ferently. First, these familiar standards are inapplicable to judicial re-
view of agency actions. Rather, the usual division between factual and 
discretionary decisions as the province of the initial decisionmaker, on 
the one hand, and legal questions as the province of the reviewing 
body, on the other, itself breaks down. Instead, in the agency context, 
some type of deference applies in almost all circumstances. 
 To begin, in reviewing formal agency proceedings subject to trial-
like procedures under the APA, courts review findings of fact using the 
“substantial evidence” standard.33 Factual findings made in informal 
proceedings are reviewed under the APA’s “arbitrary or capricious” 
standard.34 Both of these standards are highly deferential. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has defined substantial evidence review as equivalent to 
an inquiry into whether there was sufficient evidence to support a jury 
verdict,35 a notoriously deferential standard. Similarly, it has declared 
that arbitrary and capricious review is ultimately a narrow review.36 
Many lower courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit,37 have concluded that the two standards are identical.38 As in 
                                                                                                                      
 
31 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see 
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact . . . must not be set aside unless clearly erro-
neous.”). 
32 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436, 440 (2001) 
(noting that the purpose of de novo review is to allow appellate courts “to maintain con-
trol of, and to clarify, the legal principles” (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 
697 (1996))); id. at 440 (observing that standards of review may turn on considerations of 
“institutional competence”). 
33 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 
(1951). 
34 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
35 Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 477. 
36 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. 
37 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 
F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
38 See Zaring, supra note 28, at 166–67 (collecting cases). This view is shared by many 
academics. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Re-
view, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761, 764 (2008) (suggesting that there is no difference between 
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appellate review, initial factual findings are therefore given great defer-
ence in administrative review. 
 The APA also requires deference in reviewing agencies’ discretion-
ary decisions. The APA allows a court to set aside agency actions that 
are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion,”39 a standard that 
has been interpreted as an overarching requirement applying to all 
kinds of agency action, including discretionary decisions.40 Even in the 
Supreme Court’s decision requiring courts to examine a detailed list of 
facets of an agency’s discretionary action, the Court acknowledged that 
the standard is “narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency.”41 
 As to legal interpretations, some agency determinations are com-
pletely unreviewable under the APA, either because Congress vested an 
agency with complete, unbounded discretion or because Congress spe-
cifically abolished review by statute.42 A complete lack of review is, of 
course, ultimate deference, as no agency decision can be overturned if 
review is unavailable.43 Beyond unreviewable decisions, most of an 
agency’s reviewable legal interpretations also get deferential review un-
der judicially created doctrines. So-called “Chevron deference,” requiring 
courts to uphold reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous stat-
utes, applies when agencies create binding interpretive rules imple-
menting statutes they administer (the bulk of the statutes they inter-
pret).44 Agencies interpreting those statutes in guidelines or informal 
                                                                                                                      
 
the arbitrary and capricious standard and the substantial evidence test); Note, Rationalizing 
Hard Look Review After the Fact, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1909, 1910 & n.6 (2009) (contending that 
the arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence standards have been applied nearly 
identically). 
39 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006). 
40 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–44 
(1983). 
41 Id. at 43. 
42 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (“This chapter applies . . . except to the extent that—(1) stat-
utes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by 
law.”); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (describing matters as committed to agency discretion 
when “statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to ap-
ply”); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830–32 (1985) (holding that an agency’s 
refusal to take enforcement action is ordinarily committed to agency discretion). 
43 See Verkuil, supra note 10, at 689 (hypothesizing the affirmance rate of cases not sub-
ject to judicial review as 100 percent). 
44 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984). This standard, known as “Step Two,” is only reached if Congress’s intent on the 
precise question is not ascertainable after “employing the traditional tools of statutory 
construction” to determine the statute’s clear meaning. Id. at 843 n.9; see Elizabeth V. 
Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function 
of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 673, 702–11 (2007). Professor Peter Strauss 
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policies are likewise entitled to deference, under the nominally-less-
deferential (but still not de novo) “Skidmore deference,” in which a court 
should defer if it finds the agency’s rationale persuasive.45 Finally, an 
agency interpreting its own regulation is entitled to “Auer deference,” 
under which an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation is 
controlling unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula-
tion.”46 
 In contrast to the pervasive deferential standards that apply to al-
most every conceivable type of agency action (albeit with varying articu-
lations), de novo review is exceedingly rare.47 It does, however, have 
some limited applications in administrative review. For example, the 
APA itself contemplates unusual situations under which de novo review 
applies, such as when the agency’s findings of fact were inadequate.48 
In addition, under the terms of Chevron, de novo review applies to an 
agency’s interpretation of the APA, the U.S. Constitution, or a statute it 
                                                                                                                      
has reconceptualized Chevron deference as “Chevron space,” connoting an “area within 
which an administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act” with judges per-
forming the function of referees ensuring the agency stays within those bounds rather 
than deciding what the agency should do within them. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too 
Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 Colum. L. Rev. 
1143, 1145 (2012). 
45 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001) (noting that Skidmore 
held that informal agency interpretations such as letter rulings may merit some defer-
ence); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of [an agency’s] 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its considera-
tion, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). There 
are competing views on whether Skidmore deference is really any deference at all. Professor 
Colin Diver has argued that the “‘weight’ assigned to any advocate’s position is presumably 
dependent upon” the factors outlined in Skidmore, and he has concluded that “[d]eference 
in this sense is no more than ‘courteous regard.’” Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in 
the Administrative State, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 565 (1985) (discussing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 
140). Recent empirical work, however, supports the notion that Skidmore deference has a 
more practical and deferential effect than Diver’s conceptualization would predict. See 
Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 
Colum. L. Rev. 1235, 1250–52, 1259 (2007); see also Strauss, supra note 44, at 1145 (argu-
ing for Skidmore deference to be thought of instead as “Skidmore weight,” a term that more 
accurately reflects courts’ treatment of agency positions). 
46 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citi-
zens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
47 Zaring, supra note 28, at 136, 160 (concluding that although “[s]ummarizing the 
doctrine of judicial review in administrative law is no easy task,” de novo review is not at 
“the heart of administrative law”). 
48 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (2006) (encompassing situations where fact-finding by the 
agency was inadequate and providing for de novo trial). 
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does not administer.49 Thus, although some agency actions are re-
viewed de novo, deference to agency decisions is the norm.50 
B. Origins of Deference to Agencies 
 Although the deference afforded to agencies’ legal interpretations 
is largely a creature of judicial doctrines, most of the deference courts 
give to agency decisions comes from Congress’s choices made in enact-
ing the APA.51 Specifically, the text of the APA mandates deference to 
agencies’ factual findings and discretionary decisions.52 The legislative 
history reveals that although the APA was enacted precisely to check 
the growing power wielded by the administrative state, no serious pro-
posal for administrative reform ever contained a powerful provision for 
a default de novo standard of judicial review. To the contrary, Congress 
intentionally created standards of review obligating judges to defer to 
most agency positions.53 
 The APA came about largely as a reaction to the expanding admin-
istrative state during the New Deal.54 The urgency for action regarding 
administrative procedure peaked in the late 1930s, primarily as a result 
of two events. First, before 1937, opponents of the New Deal could rely 
on the Supreme Court to routinely strike down President Franklin De-
lano Roosevelt’s programs.55 In 1937, however, the Court performed an 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997); Crowell v. Benson, 
285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932). For instance, any federal agency may be called upon to interpret 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which applies to all federal agencies. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(a) (2006). 
50 Notably, Professor David Zaring has recently argued that the various standards un-
der which agency actions are reviewed all amount to a version of a “reasonableness” stan-
dard and that under any standard of review, agency actions are upheld about two-thirds of 
the time. Zaring, supra note 28, at 137; see also infra notes 159–165 and accompanying text 
(describing Zaring’s argument in more detail). 
51 See 5 U.S.C. § 706. Although Chevron was a judicially created doctrine, Congress was 
aware of the direction courts were taking in deferring to agencies on questions of law and 
in 1981 considered, but did not pass, a law that would have encouraged courts to afford 
less deference to agencies on legal questions. See generally Ronald M. Levin, Review of “Juris-
dictional” Issues Under the Bumpers Amendment, 1983 Duke L.J. 355 (discussing the proposed 
Bumpers Amendment). 
52 See 5 U.S.C. § 706. In addition, the APA mandates deference on legal questions to 
the extent that it provides for circumstances in which no review is available, which is an 
ultimate form of deference. See id. § 702. 
53 See infra notes 79–105 and accompanying text. 
54 See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges 
from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1559 (1996). 
55 Id. at 1568–69 (documenting the lack of legislative will to pass early proposals for 
administrative reform, such as the 1933 bill introduced by Senator Marvel Mills Logan). 
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about-face on the New Deal programs, upholding the federal govern-
ment’s power to enact program after program.56 Accordingly, adminis-
trative reform became the primary way in which New Deal programs 
could be checked.57 Second, the European dictators’ growing power at 
the time fueled concerns about communist and totalitarian regimes 
and their potential threat to American democracy.58 The growth of the 
administrative state was seen by some as antidemocratic and anticapital-
ist. For instance, an American Bar Association report decried “unfet-
tered discretion to administrative agencies [as] ‘a Marxian idea,’”59 and 
one member of Congress argued that “[w]hen we allow Government 
bureaus to make rules that are tantamount to laws, and then permit no 
appeal from them, we are rapidly approaching the totalitarian state.”60 
In sum, the routine survival of New Deal programs against court chal-
lenges and the fear that New Deal programs portended anticapitalist 
dictatorship made administrative reform a legislative priority. 
 In particular, judicial review of agency actions was seen as the ulti-
mate check on the growing administrative state, and questions of scope 
of review became a central part of the debate. As described by one 
scholar, Senator Marvel Mills Logan, the proponent of an administra-
tive procedure bill that nearly became law (it was passed by Congress in 
1940 but was vetoed by President Roosevelt), explained that the “pur-
pose [of the bill] was to enlarge the availability of judicial review of 
agency decisions.”61 That bill put forth some of the strongest agency 
controls ever proposed62 and was viewed as a direct attack on the New 
                                                                                                                      
56 Although known as the “switch in time that saved nine,” one scholar has noted that 
Justice Owen Roberts switched his vote on the first of these cases before the court-packing 
plan had been announced, probably in response to President Roosevelt’s electoral victory 
in 1936 and broad popular support for his programs, as well as legislative efforts to curtail 
the Court’s judicial review powers. Id. at 1563; see W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937). 
57 Shepherd, supra note 54, at 1563–64 (observing that once the Supreme Court en-
dorsed the New Deal programs, opponents of the New Deal turned to Congress to restrain 
the administrative state). 
58 Id. at 1581, 1593. 
59 Id. at 1591 (citing Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 A.B.A. Ann. 
Rep. 340 (1938)). President Roosevelt himself felt the need to respond to critics who 
viewed his growing power as akin to Adolf Hitler—he publicly stated, “I have no inclina-
tion to be a dictator.” Id. at 1581. 
60 See id. at 1610 (quoting 86 Cong. Rec. 4534 (1940) (statement of Rep. Michener)). 
61 Id. at 1602, 1632. 
62 For a graphic representation of the strength of the protections for individuals 
against the administrative state, see id. at 1619–20. 
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Deal.63 Critics claimed that the bill would “tie up administrative agen-
cies so completely that they would never get a chance to get any of their 
work done,”64 and that it would allow “judges [to] substitute their views 
for those of the administrative officers.”65 Yet even the most aggressive 
versions of the bill provided for deferential judicial review of agency 
actions;66 de novo review was never on the table.67 
 After multiple attempts to pass an administrative procedure re-
form bill failed, Congress temporarily abandoned the project with the 
outbreak of World War II.68 The war itself, however, had the unantici-
pated consequence of arousing substantial public objection to the vast 
administrative state, as the public blamed war agencies for many of the 
inefficiencies and unfairness of wartime society.69 Consequently,  ad-
ministrative reform was at the top of the legislative agenda when the 
new Congress opened in early 1945.70 After some public debate, nego-
tiations among Congress, agencies, and the Roosevelt and Truman ad-
ministrations were conducted behind closed doors.71 These negotia-
tions led to the bill that eventually became the APA. 
 The official legislative history, consciously scant because of the 
backdoor nature of the compromise that led to the APA’s passage,72 
nonetheless explains that the judicial review provision of the APA was 
designed to “preserve[]” the “basic exception of administrative discre-
tion.”73 It carried out this purpose by codifying the “substantial evi-
dence” standard that had been used by the courts to review agency fact-
                                                                                                                      
63 Shepherd, supra note 54, at 1610. Particular programs and agencies, such as the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, were seen as primary targets. Id. 
64 Id. at 1600 (quoting 86 Cong. Rec. 4654 (statement of Rep. Edelstein)). 
65 Id. at 1605 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1149, at 3 (1940)). 
66 For instance, the version of the bill originally passed by the House of Representa-
tives allowed review of factual findings by agencies under the “clearly erroneous” standard, 
and the Senate struck that provision. See id. at 1621. 
67 The closest anyone might have come was an American Bar Association (ABA) pro-
posal to permit a court to review evidence under the “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard, but that proposal was abandoned, even by the ABA. Id. at 1660. 
68 Id. at 1641. 
69 Shepherd, supra note 54, at 1642–43. In particular, the public challenged the Office 
of Price Administration and the Office of War Mobilization, which consumers and farmers 
criticized for failing to control inflation, problems with rationing and the unavailability of 
products, and issues with price controls. Id. at 1641–42. 
70 See id. at 1654. 
71 Id. at 1661, 1655. 
72 Id. at 1663. 
73 Administrative Procedure: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong. 84 
(1945) (statement of Carl McFarland, Chairman, ABA Special Comm. on Admin. Law). 
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finding.74 Even those who complained that courts’ application of the 
substantial evidence standard amounted to a rubber stamp on agency 
decisions did not propose de novo review.75 Rather, competing propos-
als (ultimately rejected) would have mandated review that upheld 
agency action only if it was supported by the weight or preponderance 
of the evidence.76 It was always intended, as the bill’s Senate Report 
stated, that “[i]n the first instance . . . it [would] be the function of the 
agency to determine the sufficiency of the evidence upon which it 
acts.”77 The Report also suggested that it did not intend for the bill to 
“result in some undue impairment of a particular administrative func-
tion.”78 
 The legislative history thus demonstrates that despite a decade-long 
fight for administrative reform that would entail meaningful judicial 
review as a check on the growing administrative state, no serious pro-
posal ever suggested that a default de novo review standard apply to all 
agency decisions. Despite concerns about the New Deal, President Roo-
sevelt’s amassing of power, and the growing fear of totalitarianism itself, 
judicial review was meant to be deferential to the agencies. This defer-
ence seems built into the idea of a useful administrative state, which 
would be undermined if the judiciary fully replicated all agency efforts. 
C. FOIA’s De Novo Break from History 
 FOIA’s judicial review provision parts ways with the default stan-
dards of review of agency actions. First, FOIA’s judicial review provision 
expressly rejects the deferential treatment the APA mandates to agen-
cies’ factual and discretionary determinations.79 Second, FOIA’s legisla-
tive history reveals Congress’s very different concerns regarding the 
need for judicial review under FOIA than under the APA.80 
                                                                                                                      
74 Id. 
75 See id. (statement of Rep. Hatton W. Sumners, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary) (noting concern that under the substantial evidence standard, “courts look around to 
see if there is any sort of evidence to support the determination of the agency and, if it 
does find some evidence to support the determination of the agency, the determination of 
the agency is upheld”). 
76 See id. (suggesting instead that the courts “ought to consider the whole field and 
weight of the evidence”). This standard is akin to the standard used by district courts to 
grant a new trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. 
77 See S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 216–17 (1945). 
78 Id. 
79 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B) (2006). 
80 See infra notes 81–105 and accompanying text. 
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 As originally enacted, the APA included a public information ac-
cess provision, which provided, in its entirety: “Save as otherwise re-
quired by statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with 
published rule be made available to persons properly and directly con-
cerned except information held confidential for good cause found.”81 
This provision, however, proved to function more as a “withholding 
[statute] than as a disclosure statute,” and was “cited as statutory au-
thority for the withholding of virtually any piece of information” that 
an agency did not want to disclose.82 In addition, the law provided no 
judicial review.83 “Above all,” one House Report decried, “there is no 
remedy available to a citizen who has been wrongfully denied access to 
the Government’s public records.”84 
 In 1966, FOIA was signed into law.85 It abolished the vague APA 
standards for releasing public information, and in their stead, created 
the now-familiar nine enumerated categories of records that are ex-
empt from disclosure.86 It also created a formal request-and-response 
process with deadlines and rights to administrative appeal.87 FOIA also 
included a judicial review provision,88 which was seen as one of its most 
important provisions. As one member of Congress said at the time, “for 
the first time in the Government’s history, a citizen will no longer be at 
the end of the road when his request for a Government document arbi-
trarily has been turned down by some bureaucrat.”89 
                                                                                                                      
 
81 S. Rep. No. 88-1219, at 10 (1964). 
82 Id. at 8, 10; see also S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 5 (1965) (noting that one of the deficien-
cies in the present statute is that “there is no authority granted for any review of the use of 
this vague phrase by Federal officials who wish to withhold information”). 
83 S. Rep. No. 88-1219, at 10 (stating that “there [was] no remedy . . . [for the] wrong-
ful withholding of information . . . by Government officials”). 
84 H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497, at 5 (1966). 
85 See Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2006)). 
86 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9). These exemptions cover records that are (1) properly 
classified under an executive order, (2) related solely to internal personnel rules, (3) ex-
empt from disclosure by another statute, (4) trade secret or confidential commercial in-
formation, (5) not discoverable in ordinary civil litigation against the agency, (6) would 
cause an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (7) fall under certain categories of law 
enforcement records, (8) pertain to certain banking matters, and (9) concern the location 
of wells. Id. 
87 Id. § 552(a)(3)(A) (providing for request and response); id. § 552(a)(6) (providing 
deadlines for agency response and administrative appeal). 
88 Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
89 112 Cong. Rec. 13,659 (1966) (statement of Rep. Gallagher) (“One of the most im-
portant provisions of the bill is subsection C, which grants authority to the Federal district 
courts to order production of records improperly withheld. This means that for the first 
time in the Government’s history, a citizen will no longer be at the end of the road when 
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 Unlike the APA’s standards of review, however, FOIA’s judicial re-
view provision requires de novo review of all agency decisions to with-
hold requested records.90 Given the APA standards of review, the choice 
was hardly foreordained. Rather, it was seen as a break from the norm 
that was integral to FOIA’s success: “That the proceeding must be de 
novo is essential in order that the ultimate decision as to the propriety of 
the agency’s action is made by the court and [to] prevent it from be-
coming meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion.”91 Fed-
eral courts have concluded that this provision “reflects Congress’s intent 
to provide greater judicial scrutiny over an agency’s FOIA determina-
tions than over other agency rulings,”92 and “exerts a profound effect 
upon the amount of respect the court must yield to agency determina-
tions.”93 
 Despite the clear mandate in the original 1966 Act, the de novo 
review standard quickly lost its footing. In its 1973 decision in EPA v. 
Mink, the Supreme Court considered a FOIA request for records that 
had been classified under an executive order on the grounds of national 
security.94 The Court concluded that despite FOIA’s de novo review pro-
vision, Congress had not intended courts to review the propriety of clas-
sification decisions, and thus anything the government properly attested 
was classified would be exempt from disclosure, without any substantive 
judicial review.95 In essence, the Court in Mink deferred completely to 
                                                                                                                      
his request for a Government document arbitrarily has been turned down by some bu-
reaucrat.”); 112 Cong. Rec. 13,649 (statement of Rep. Fascell) (“Let me make another 
important point. S. 1160 opens the way to the Federal court system to any citizen who be-
lieves that an agency has unjustly held back information.”). 
90 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (“In such a case the court shall determine the matter de 
novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine 
whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions 
set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its 
action.”). 
91 111 Cong. Rec. 26,823 (1965); see also H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497, at 9 (1966) (“The 
proceedings are to be de novo so that the court can consider the propriety of the with-
holding instead of being restricted to judicial sanctioning of agency discretion.”). 
92 Rizzo v. Taylor, 438 F. Supp. 895, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
93 Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 840 F.2d 26, 31 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1988), vacated on 
other grounds, 898 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
94 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81–84 (1973), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, 
Pub. L. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), as recognized in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985). 
95 See Mink, 410 U.S. at 81 (noting that “Congress chose to follow the Executive’s de-
termination” on classification and thus did not permit in camera inspection of the docu-
ments or compelled disclosure of documents, such as those in this case, that were classified 
pursuant to executive order). 
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an agency determination on classification, which exempted the records 
from disclosure.96 
 Congress immediately responded to this decision. In 1974, now 
particularly energized by the Watergate scandal and the public’s deep 
distrust of government power,97 Congress made several important 
amendments to FOIA designed to strengthen the public’s right to in-
formation.98 Relevant here, Congress amended the judicial review pro-
vision to override the Supreme Court’s decision in Mink and to provide 
for de novo review over all exemption claims, including national secu-
rity classifications.99 The legislation reflected a rejection of the sugges-
tion by some members of Congress that a deferential standard of review 
should apply in the national security context.100 In fact, this issue was 
partly the cause of President Gerald Ford’s decision to veto the bill and 
proclaim, 
I propose, therefore, that where classified documents are re-
quested the courts could review the classification, but would 
have to uphold the classification if there is a reasonable basis 
to support it. In determining the reasonableness of the classi-
fication, the courts would consider all attendant evidence 
prior to resorting to an in camera examination of the docu-
ment.101 
                                                                                                                      
96 See id. at 93. 
97 Veto Battle 30 Years Ago Set Freedom of Information Norms, Nat’l Security Archive, 
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/index.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2012) (not-
ing that movement toward reinvigorating FOIA was made against the background of the 
Watergate scandal). 
98 See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)). 
99 Congress effectuated this change in two ways. First, it changed the language of Ex-
emption 1 itself, which used to exempt records “specifically required by Executive order to 
be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy,” to make clear that 
courts should look behind classification labels. See Mink, 410 U.S. at 81. The new Exemp-
tion 1 covers records “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive 
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and . . . are in 
fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Second, 
Congress added a provision to FOIA specifically allowing courts to conduct in camera re-
view of withheld records. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
100 See Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1193–94 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (remarking that Con-
gress established de novo review against some senators’ assertions that agency withholding 
decisions involving national security matters should be reviewed using a “reasonable basis” 
standard). 
101 120 Cong. Rec. 36,243 (1974) (veto message from President Ford). 
200 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:185 
President Ford’s veto thus called on Congress to implement a deferen-
tial standard of review over national security claims under FOIA.102 
Congress’s resolve to restore the de novo standard for judicial review of 
FOIA cases, however, was so strong that Congress overrode the veto.103 
Accordingly, the de novo standard was restored, even for cases in which 
the government invokes the exemption that covers records classified 
for national security reasons.104 As one member of Congress stated in 
response to President Ford’s veto, 
The courts, in my view, have a duty to look behind any claim 
of exemption, which all too often in the past has been used to 
cover up inefficiency or embarrassment even in foreign policy 
matters which, many times, are fully known by other countries 
but not printable in our own—supposedly the most democ-
ratic and most open in the world.105 
Congress has thus twice insisted on de novo review over agency FOIA 
exemption claims—once in 1966, when it first enacted the law, and 
again in 1974, when it overruled Mink. 
D. Explaining FOIA’s Exceptionalism 
 The legislative histories of the APA and FOIA demonstrate that 
Congress acted deliberately both to build in great deference generally 
to agency factual and discretionary determinations and to demand full 
and searching judicial review over agencies’ FOIA exemption determi-
nations. Even apart from the words of the legislators who drafted and 
passed these bills, the rationales supporting a deferential approach to 
agency actions themselves justify a departure in FOIA cases. That is, the 
reasons for invoking deference to other agency fact-finding and exer-
                                                                                                                      
102 Id. at 36,243–44. 
103 See id. at 36,244; see also Ray, 587 F.2d at 1190–91 (“In 1974 Congress overrode a 
presidential veto and amended the FOIA for the express purpose of changing this aspect 
of the Mink case.”). 
104 See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,244 (statement of Rep. Moorhead) (“As in the Watergate 
debacle, the umbrella of ‘national security’ is now being raised in the veto message to 
cover the real reasons for the bureaucrat’s opposition to the public’s right to know. . . . 
Contrary to the President’s expressed view, the bill would not in any way bare our Nation’s 
secrets, nor would it jeopardize the security of sensitive national defense or foreign policy 
information.”); see also Ray, 587 F.2d at 1194 (explaining that Congress “stressed the need 
for an objective, independent judicial determination, and insisted that judges could be 
trusted to approach the national security determinations with common sense, and without 
jeopardy to national security”). 
105 120 Cong. Rec. 36,626 (statement of Rep. Reid). 
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cise of discretion do not apply with equal force to FOIA. Moreover, the 
unique purposes of FOIA standing alone justify the scrutiny of de novo 
judicial review. 
 Deference to agency fact-finding and exercise of discretion is 
rooted in the notion that agencies bring to bear a special expertise on 
these matters. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit summarized Supreme Court 
precedent on this point as follows: “We recognize that where, as here, a 
court reviews an agency action ‘involv[ing] primarily issues of fact,’ and 
where ‘analysis of the relevant documents requires a high level of tech-
nical expertise,’ we must ‘defer to the informed discretion of the re-
sponsible federal agencies.’”106 The D.C. Circuit has seconded, indicat-
ing that it “routinely defers to administrative agencies on matters 
relating to their areas of technical expertise” when looking at questions 
of fact and discretionary decisions.107 In making FOIA decisions, how-
ever, although agencies are more familiar with the contents of their re-
cords than are the courts, the critical factual decisions that determine 
whether the records must be released often turn on facts not within the 
agency’s expertise. 
 Consider the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). When the 
NRC makes a decision about the necessary safety features of a nuclear 
power plant, there is good reason for a court to defer to the expertise 
of the scientific, technical, and policy staff at the NRC who know far 
more about nuclear power plants than generalist judges know or could 
hope to learn. Suppose, however, a member of the public submits a 
FOIA request to the NRC to release the business records of one of its 
regulated companies. If the NRC wishes to claim the FOIA exemption 
pertaining to agency-held confidential commercial and financial re-
cords of third parties,108 under which the question whether release of a 
record would cause the third party submitter competitive harm is cen-
tral to the inquiry,109 a court is likely as qualified as the NRC to assess 
whether those records, if released, will cause competitive injury to the 
company. Industry competition is not the technical specialty of the 
NRC. To take another example, the Department of Homeland Security 
                                                                                                                      
106 Sierra Club v. EPA, 346 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural 
Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)). 
107 Tripoli Rocketry Ass’n v. ATF, 437 F.3d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
108 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006). 
109 See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 169 F.3d 16, 18 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). The question of competitive harm is central to an inquiry whether records are ex-
empt from disclosure under FOIA’s Exemption 4, which covers confidential commercial 
and financial information received from a business. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 
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does not have special expertise regarding which records, if released, 
might cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of someone’s personal pri-
vacy, which would render them exempt from disclosure under FOIA’s 
Exemption 6.110 
 Admittedly, some exemption determinations do turn on facts 
uniquely within the agency’s area of knowledge. Yet unique considera-
tions at the heart of FOIA’s transparency goal nonetheless justify Con-
gress’s departure from the APA. For instance, an agency is uniquely po-
sitioned to determine whether records are predecisional and 
deliberative documents that are exempt from disclosure under Exemp-
tion 5’s deliberative process privilege.111 The agency’s expertise in its 
own decision-making process, however, should not justify deference, 
because the agency is not a neutral arbiter or guardian of the public 
interest in a FOIA case. Instead, the agency might illegitimately over-
reach to keep information from the public and thereby protect itself 
from embarrassment and avoid democratic accountability for its ac-
tions. Likewise, a law enforcement agency that makes a determination 
that release of records will impede an ongoing investigation may have 
particular competence in the area,112 but again, the agency would be 
passing judgment on an exemption under which it could hide informa-
tion about its own misconduct and prevent oversight. In such cases, the 
agency is hardly a neutral decisionmaker. 
 In FOIA cases agencies frequently have illegitimate self-interest at 
stake. Agencies have often been found to have failed to release records 
to cover up their mistakes, embarrassing acts, or misconduct.113 Even 
more frequently, the institutional pressures of career advancement, risk 
aversion, and institutional culture weigh heavily on the side of secrecy 
for the agency employee considering a FOIA request.114 By contrast, 
other types of agency actions tend to align the agency’s interests with 
                                                                                                                      
110 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). 
111 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (exempting “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums 
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation 
with the agency”). 
112 This conclusion would justify withholding under Exemption 7(A). See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(7)(A). 
113 See Fuchs, supra note 12, at 153; see also Alan B. Morrison, Balancing Access to Gov-
ernment-Controlled Information, 14 J.L. & Pol’y 115, 118 (2006) (hypothesizing why govern-
ment officials routinely deny requests for documents). 
114 Morrison, supra note 113, at 118 (noting that “no government official ever received 
a promotion or a medal for releasing a document to the public,” and that withholding 
decisions are often “based on the agency official’s different assessment of the benefits and 
risks of disclosure as opposed to the assessment of those seeking the information and per-
haps those who wrote the law”). 
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the public. For example, when an agency adjudicates a benefits enti-
tlement, it may have a “self-interest” in safeguarding its budget, but that 
interest is shared by both Congress, which gave the agency its powers, 
and the general public. Similarly, an agency conducting a rulemaking 
may have something akin to “self-interest” in avoiding public backlash. 
But again, these considerations are a legitimate part of the democratic 
process of holding the agency accountable to the public. Indeed, agen-
cies are typically required to seek public input as part of the APA-
mandated rulemaking process.115 In contrast, the agency’s self-interest 
in the FOIA context does not advance a legitimate democratic purpose. 
In fact, Congress’s clear intent to provide de novo review and the reality 
that traditional justifications for deference do not hold up in the FOIA 
context require courts to look at FOIA determinations with a fresh eye. 
  A final issue of deference remains. Deference to agencies’ legal 
interpretations is almost entirely a creature of the judiciary; such defer-
ence is not mandated by the text of the APA.116 In 1984, in Chevron v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court justified courts’ 
deference to agencies’ legal interpretations of ambiguous provisions in 
statutes the agencies are charged with administering based on the the-
ory that Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to interpret 
the ambiguity.117 This justification does not apply in the context of 
FOIA. First, FOIA is not administered by any particular agency, but 
rather binds all of them.118 No single agency would have special compe-
tence to interpret FOIA’s legal requirements or the language of any 
particular exemption. Second, Congress expressly did not delegate to 
an agency authority to interpret any ambiguities in FOIA. Instead, it 
expressly required courts to review an agency’s interpretations of FOIA 
de novo.119 Congress’s choice to mandate de novo review of agencies’ 
                                                                                                                      
 
115 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
116 To be sure, a convincing argument can be made that the APA’s provision dictating 
that a reviewing court shall “decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional 
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an 
agency action,” is consistent with Chevron, and moreover that it intended to incorporate 
previously decided cases such as Skidmore, which rested on the same principles. See Strauss, 
supra note 44, at 1158–61. 
117 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
118 See AT&T, Inc., v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. 
Ct. 1177 (2011); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 162 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (en banc), aff’d, 484 U.S. 9 (1987). 
119 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (“In such a case the court shall determine the matter de 
novo . . . .”). One scholar suggests another rationale for rejecting deference to FOIA deci-
sions: “FOIA denials, unlike most other agency actions, are made without adjudication, 
notice and comment, or other protections.” Fuchs, supra note 12, at 162. This rationale has 
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FOIA determinations, whether factual, legal, or discretionary, was thus 
amply justified by the special considerations relevant to FOIA decisions. 
II. De Novo Review on Paper but Not in Practice 
 Congress’s assignment of de novo review to agency FOIA decisions, 
in contrast to its treatment of nearly all other agency actions, was not 
intended to be a distinction without a difference.120 As the legislative 
history reveals, legislators believed that the choice of which standard of 
review should apply was important, presumably because different stan-
dards may lead to different outcomes. Countless judicial opinions, in-
cluding the U.S. Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence, presume that the 
standard of review impacts the outcomes in particular cases.121 This, in 
turn, would result in differing rates of reversal of agency actions. 
 Professor Paul Verkuil has examined the relationship between af-
firmance rate and the applicable standard of review.122 His model for 
understanding the operation of various levels of deference articulates 
with specificity a sentiment shared by many jurists and scholars about 
the way standards of review are meant to operate.123 According to his 
model, the most deferential standard, arbitrary and capricious, is akin 
to a pass/fail standard that is “intended to produce a high pass rate.”124 
Verkuil likens the substantial evidence and clearly erroneous standards, 
which supposedly entail still deferential but more searching review, to a 
standard affirming all cases that get a “B” or “C” grade.125 Finally, a rule 
affirming only “A” grade work is akin to de novo review.126 Further-
more, Verkuil assigns hypothesized affirmance rates for each standard 
of review: under a de novo review standard as falling between 40% and 
50%, clearly erroneous between 70% and 80%, substantial evidence 
                                                                                                                      
justified the lesser Skidmore deference, rather than Chevron deference, to agencies’ legal 
interpretations of statutes they are charged with administering. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231–
35. It has not, however, been a reason to lessen deference substantially in the context of 
agency fact-finding or discretionary decisions. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (applying 
arbitrary and capricious review to facts found in an informal adjudication). 
120 Verkuil, supra note 10, at 682. 
121 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (“The upshot in terms of judicial re-
view is some practical difference in outcome depending upon which standard is used.”); 
Zaring, supra note 28, at 136–38. 
122 Verkuil, supra note 10, at 692; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial 
Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 77, 84 (2011) (observing that Verkuil’s study 
is the most comprehensive empirical study of district court review of agency decisions). 
123 See, e.g., Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 162. 
124 Verkuil, supra note 10, at 688. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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between 75% and 85%, and arbitrary and capricious review at 85% to 
90%.127 
 Verkuil’s attempt to test this hypothesis empirically, however, pro-
duces a startling result—the Social Security Administration’s disability 
benefits determinations, reviewed for an abuse of discretion (akin to 
arbitrary and capricious), are affirmed only 50% of the time, whereas 
agencies’ decisions not to release records under FOIA, reviewed de 
novo, are affirmed at a rate of 90%.128 This result is nearly the exact 
opposite of Verkuil’s theorized affirmance rates for the relevant stan-
dards of review.129 He posits that some of the gap may be explained by 
peculiar FOIA jurisprudence in the national security area, but con-
cludes that this “phenomenon still does not explain the overall FOIA 
outcomes divergence.”130 Verkuil also notes judicial skepticism toward 
FOIA claims as one factor in the high affirmance rate,131 but ultimately 
concludes that “FOIA cases are hard if not impossible to explain in 
terms of outcomes analysis if de novo is to be a meaningful standard of 
review.”132 Instead, Verkuil posits, other factors beyond the standard of 
review must be producing the 90% affirmance rate.133 
 As such, there is a wide gap between the law as it is theorized and 
the law as it plays out in judicial review of agency FOIA decisions.134 
                                                                                                                      
 
127 Id. at 689. 
128 Id. at 719. At least one aspect of Verkuil’s calculation of FOIA case outcomes seems 
debatable, namely his inclusion as a form of “affirmance” those stipulated dismissals in 
which no costs or attorneys’ fees were awarded to the plaintiff. See id. at 713 n.152. Cer-
tainly, the assumption seems facially reasonable that a plaintiff’s case must not have merit 
if no costs or fees are awarded in a settlement, despite being available for prevailing plain-
tiffs. See id. One wonders whether that assumption would stand up to testing in light of 
Evans v. Jeff D., in which the Supreme Court sanctioned settlement negotiations in which 
favorable substantive results may be won by giving up rights to attorney’s fees. 475 U.S. 
717, 736–38 (1986). Nonetheless, the cases in this posture are not so numerous as to call 
into any serious doubt the conclusion Verkuil draws from the study. 
129 Verkuil, supra note 10, at 719. 
130 Id. at 715. 
131 See id. at 715–16. Verkuil attributes the judicial skepticism to concern about law en-
forcement effectiveness, the unsympathetic nature of many FOIA plaintiffs, concerns 
about terrorism, and the burden of FOIA compliance on agencies. See id. As to the “un-
sympathetic nature” of many FOIA plaintiffs, he notes that FOIA plaintiffs are often pris-
oners appearing pro se or business competitors seeking to take advantage of the Act for 
selfish reasons. Id. at 716. 
132 Id. at 730. 
133 See id.; see also Pierce, supra note 122, at 84–86 (supporting Verkuil’s conclusion that 
his findings require an examination of the decision-making context to identify unique 
institutional characteristics that lead to the anomalous results he found). 
134 Bridging this gap is often referred to as the work of new legal realism. See Stewart 
Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the Navigation of The Yellow Submarine, 
80 Tul. L. Rev. 1161, 1165, 1166 (2006) (describing the “new legal realism” as “mov[ing] us 
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Verkuil’s surprising affirmance rate finding cannot be fully explained 
by existing theories of dispute resolution. First, one classic model exam-
ining the selection bias of those cases that make it to the end of the ad-
judicatory process anticipates that individual litigants acting in their 
own self-interest will drop or settle all but the closest of cases, thereby 
creating a strong bias for a 50% success rate for plaintiffs or for appel-
lants in those adjudicated cases.135 Second, deviation from this pre-
dicted rate has been attributed to differing incentives between the par-
ties and strategies used by frequent litigants—a theory that predicts 
high success rates for repeat players, such as the government.136 Finally, 
recent empirical work posits that regardless of the standard of review 
announced in the case, courts affirm agencies between 60% and 70% 
of the time.137 
 Although all of these theories may shed light on the FOIA affir-
mance rate observed by Verkuil, none fully explains it. Consider the 
theory that cases that reach an adjudicatory resolution are the product 
of a strong selection effect. Huge numbers of cases are never filed, are 
voluntarily dismissed before an adjudication, or are settled between the 
parties, and the outcomes of those cases that are adjudicated are 
skewed by the decisions the litigants made along the way.138 New legal 
realists have critiqued the practice of studying only those cases that 
have reached a final judgment (or, even more so, a final appeal) as 
“tak[ing] for granted that there is a great pyramid of disputing whose 
most important level is at the top.”139 Rather, these theorists emphasize 
that how well the law is working must be analyzed on the ground; that 
is, including lawsuits that are settled before an adjudication is reached 
or are voluntarily dismissed or withdrawn as a result of pre-trial strate-
                                                                                                                      
to the law in action and the living law,” rather than an “assumed paradigm” of how the law 
works). Professor David Zaring recently made the “normative recommendation . . . that 
courts and scholars . . . focus more on the unarticulated bases for reversal in administrative 
law and less on standards of review.” Zaring, supra note 28, at 186. 
135 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
Legal Stud. 1, 4–5 (1984). 
136 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 108 (1974); Priest & Klein, supra note 135, at 53. 
137 See Zaring, supra note 28, at 169. 
138 See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 135 (examining the issue of which cases make 
it to adjudication). 
139 Macaulay, supra note 134, at 1163; see Marc Galanter, Notes on the Future of Social Re-
search in Law, in Law & Society: Readings on the Social Study of Law, 25, 25–27 
(Stewart Macaulay et al. eds., 1995). 
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gies, and even disputes that never materialize into a lawsuit because of 
the predictions of the litigants and the tactics of their lawyers.140 
 Prominent theorists on pre-adjudication litigant behavior have 
modeled the tendency to produce a 50% success rate for plaintiffs or 
appellants where both parties have similar stakes and act to maximize 
their self-interest in settlement negotiations.141 This bias toward a 50% 
success rate is the result of litigants settling out all but the closest cases 
based on expectations of success or failure and the risk involved.142 The 
theorists acknowledge, however, that the “observed rate of success in 
any individual set of cases is determined by several factors.”143 In par-
ticular, unequal stakes in the litigation between the parties or other pe-
culiar incentives unique to the class of litigation studied may produce 
significant departures from this hypothesized success rate.144 
                                                                                                                      
140 See Macaulay, supra note 134, at 1163; see also Galanter, supra note 139, at 25–27 
(contending that most legal scholars assume that the most important disputes are the ones 
that go to trial). 
141 Priest & Klein, supra note 135, at 5. 
142 See id. 
143 Id. at 55. Another factor that might affect the fifty percent success rate is unequal 
information about the likely success between the parties. Id. at 19 (“[A]n important de-
terminant of the extent to which the observed success rate approximates 50 percent will be 
the parties’ error in estimating the outcome.”). At first blush, this seems like a plausible 
explanation for deviation in the FOIA context, since the government almost always has 
more information about the underlying lawsuit than the requester, and therefore might 
make more accurate predictions about the merits. Typically, in FOIA litigation, the gov-
ernment releases records to the requester as it realizes that it has no defensible basis for 
withholding them, and then the adjudication only concerns any remaining records still in 
dispute. See, e.g., Hussain v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 674 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263 (D.D.C. 
2009) (noting that the parties were only disputing the release of five out of the original 
documents); Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time Within Which to 
Respond to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Hussain, 674 F. Supp. 2d 260 
(No. 07-1633) (noting that one day before the government filed its motion for summary 
judgment, it released ninety-six pages of previously withheld documents to the plaintiff). If 
the government’s information led it to make more accurate predictions, it would not be 
taking litigation positions it later realizes it cannot defend. Even as to those litigation posi-
tions it does ultimately defend, I suspect that the government makes that decision based 
on the perceived importance of secrecy to the government’s interests in light of the re-
sources required to litigate the exemption, rather than the perceived likelihood of success 
on the merits of the exemption’s applicability. Although I cannot prove the government’s 
subjective motivations, my inclination is based on the agency’s rational self-interest in 
fighting to the end over records they do not want made public, for whatever reason (le-
gitimate under FOIA or not), given that they are not bearing the expense of their defense, 
which is provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. 
144 As one example, Professors George Priest and Benjamin Klein explain an eighty-
one percent success rate for the government in antitrust prosecutions as the product of 
differential stakes between the parties. Priest & Klein, supra note 135, at 52–53 (citing 
William Baxter, The Political Economy of Antitrust: Principal Paper (Robert D. 
Tollison ed., 1980)). 
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 The effect of the selection of cases that are adjudicated on out-
comes is worthy of consideration in the FOIA context because only a 
tiny fraction of agency FOIA decisions are ever reviewed in court. For 
example, in fiscal year 2011, 644,165 FOIA requests were made, with 
438,638 final agency decisions, resulting in 202,164 denials in full or in 
part.145 By contrast, there are consistently between 300 to 500 lawsuits 
filed challenging FOIA denials each year.146 Thus, the vast majority of 
FOIA law operates wholly at the administrative level where pre-dispute 
selection effects are likely to be strong.147 Nonetheless, the default 50% 
success rate hypothesis does not operate here. Were that model to op-
erate as predicted in FOIA cases, a high rate of affirmance of agency 
denials would dissuade prospective litigants from pursuing marginal 
cases. This, in turn, would increase the odds that comparatively more 
meritorious cases would be adjudicated rather than settled, eventually 
lowering the success rate of agencies back to an equilibrium of around 
a 50% affirmance rate. As Verkuil demonstrates, however, the agencies’ 
90% success rate shows no signs of moderating.148 
 The primary factor Professors George Priest and Benjamin Klein 
identify as potentially driving deviation from the 50% success rate hy-
pothesis—differences in the incentives between the parties—may be 
partially responsible for the affirmance rate in FOIA cases, but is 
unlikely to explain it fully.149 In his influential work, Why the “Haves” 
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, Professor Marc 
Galanter describes how repeat players in the litigation system engage in 
a long-term strategy to procure favorable precedent, even at the cost of 
                                                                                                                      
145 FOIA Data at a Glance, What Is FOIA?, U.S. Dep’t of Just., http://www.foia.gov (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
146 See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Federal Court Cases: Integrated Database (1979–
2008), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/landing.jsp (select “Find & Analyze Data,” 
then search for “federal judicial center integrated database”) (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
This dataset was examined in Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 
Am. U. L. Rev. 217, 227 (2011). 
147 See Justin Cox, Maximizing Information’s Freedom: The Nuts, Bolts, and Levers of FOIA, 13 
N.Y. City L. Rev. 387, 396 (2010) (“[U]nlike many other areas of the law where enforcement 
is broadly decentralized, only a small fraction of the millions of FOIA decisions made annu-
ally are ever scrutinized by someone with the power or authority to alter them.”). 
148 See Verkuil, supra note 10, at 734 (reporting the affirmance rate for the ten-year pe-
riod of 1990 to 1999). Because Verkuil’s statistical period begins almost twenty-five years 
after FOIA’s enactment, one might assume that if equilibrium were to be reached, this rate 
would be abating. 
149 See Priest & Klein, supra note 135, at 53; see also Verkuil, supra note 10, at 718 n.181 
(citing Priest and Klein’s selection hypothesis as a possible explanation for the FOIA af-
firmance rate). 
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the immediate stakes in a single dispute.150 When a “repeat player” liti-
gates against a “one-shotter,” the incentives of the parties are uneven.151 
As Priest and Klein explain, “Stakes are most clearly symmetrical where 
the parties seek solely a dollar judgment in a dispute over activities in 
which neither party ever expects to engage again.”152 
 For FOIA litigation, none of these ideal conditions for symmetrical 
stakes exists. First, FOIA suits do not involve claims for monetary dam-
ages, but only injunctive relief.153 Second, the government is the ulti-
mate repeat player.154 Even breaking down the government defendants 
by agency, FOIA requests are heavily concentrated on a relatively small 
number of agencies and departments, each with its own interest in se-
curing favorable long-term legal rules.155 Finally, even the plaintiff may 
be a repeat FOIA requester with his or her own long-term agenda, 
thereby further distorting the incentives.156 And even if the requester is 
not a repeat requester, the importance of the information to each re-
quester will vary widely.157 Most especially, however, the government’s 
strategic advantages as a repeat player and long-term goal of procuring 
favorable precedent over a short-term victory are likely to skew the pre-
adjudication selection effect and contribute to the government’s high 
success rate.158 
                                                                                                                      
150 See Galanter, supra note 136, at 100–05. 
151 See id. 
152 Priest & Klein, supra note 135, at 28. Thus, they suggest that parties will have more 
equal incentives to litigate (and therefore, would be more likely to proceed to trial) when 
their stakes in the outcome are equal. They also note that if one of the parties (in the typi-
cal FOIA case, the government), expects to continue to engage in the same activity that 
led to the dispute (here, denying a FOIA request), that party’s stake in the litigation will be 
much higher because the judgment will affect future behavior. Id. 
153 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006) (specifying that suits may be brought in district 
courts to enjoin an agency from withholding records). Attorney’s fees are, however, avail-
able to prevailing plaintiffs. Id. 
154 See Galanter, supra note 136, at 111–12. As Galanter explains, having the government 
as a party to a lawsuit increases the likelihood that a case is adjudicated because of the gov-
ernment’s incentive to “externalize the decision to the courts,” the incentive of opponents to 
litigate against the government, and the government’s unique decision-making process. Id. 
155 For example, in fiscal year 2011, half of all FOIA requests were made to just four 
agencies: the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and 
Justice. Top 10 Federal Agencies Receiving the Most FOIA Requests, FOIA Project, http://trac.syr. 
edu/foiaproject/foia_requests.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
156 For example, organizations such as Public Citizen, the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion, and Judicial Watch are repeat players in the FOIA context. 
157 See Galanter, supra note 136, at 111 (providing, as an example, an organization that 
sponsors much church-state litigation, and explaining that there are some repeat players who 
“seek not furtherance of tangible interests, but vindication of fundamental cultural commit-
ments” and that when such a repeat player is involved, “there is less tendency to settle”). 
158 See id. at 100–05. 
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 It is unlikely, however, that all of the deviation from the 50% affir-
mance rate hypothesized both by Verkuil’s work and Priest and Klein’s 
theory can be attributed to the government’s repeat-player status and 
the nature of the remedies. Were that the case, there should be similar 
astronomical success rates for other types of litigation challenging 
agency decisions, which share the government as the defendant and 
also involve nonmonetary claims. Professor David Zaring recently con-
ducted an empirical study on affirmance rates across various standards 
of review.159 His findings, like Verkuil’s, do not support the hypothe-
sized affirmance rates set out by Verkuil.160 Instead, he concludes that 
“[c]ourts reverse agencies at roughly the same [60 to 70%] rate, re-
gardless of the standard of review.”161 He posits that despite hand-
wringing over the appropriate standard of review, courts in practice ap-
proach review of agency actions as more of a reasonableness analysis, 
thus producing similar affirmance rates across differing standards of 
review.162 This theory of judicial review is supported by his empirical 
evidence.163 
 But FOIA is an outlier. The consistent 60% to 70% affirmance rate 
across agencies, courts, and standards of review, is not reflected in 
FOIA decisions, which, as noted, affirm agency nondisclosure at a 90% 
rate.164 Zaring was surprised by Verkuil’s finding in light of his own re-
search; he suggests that possible differences may be attributed to dif-
ferent approaches that district and appellate courts may take in review-
ing agency decisions.165 
 Although this extraordinary affirmance rate may be attributable in 
part to known theories, a 90% affirmance of agency FOIA decisions is 
at odds with the statute’s de novo standard of review and cannot be 
fully explained by the dominant theories of pre-adjudication selection 
effects or the unique nature of litigation against the government. De-
spite the courts’ formal invocation of the statutory de novo standard, 
this affirmance rate likely represents a super-deference, which produces 
                                                                                                                      
159 See generally Zaring, supra note 28 (summarizing the results of his findings). 
160 See id. at 169. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. (“Although there are a number of possible conclusions to draw, the doctrinal one 
worth taking most seriously is that, unless there is some reason to believe that these very simi-
lar validation rates mask very different sorts of inquiries, what courts are really doing is the 
same sort of analysis regardless of the standard of review. The consistency in outcomes sug-
gest a consistent inquiry: courts look to see if the agency has acted reasonably.”). 
163 Id. 
164 Verkuil, supra note 10, at 719. 
165 Zaring, supra note 28, at 176 n.134. 
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even more affirmances than cases reviewed under formally deferential 
standards. As the data indicate, the way courts actually review agency 
decisions to withhold records under FOIA is not the de novo review 
Congress required. 
III. Systematizing Deference to Secrecy 
 An examination of FOIA decisions reveals that, whether intention-
ally or unintentionally, courts have developed a set of practices in FOIA 
cases that collectively contribute to this super-deferential review. The 
practices divide into two categories, which I call “spoken” and “unspo-
ken” deference. The spoken deference practices are instances where 
courts, despite the express mandate for de novo review, have concluded 
that some deference to a relevant agency position is warranted under a 
common law theory.166 Unspoken deference is a set of procedural prac-
tices developed uniquely for FOIA cases—contrary to the supposed 
trans-substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Federal 
Rules”)—which produce significant litigation advantages to the gov-
ernment and effectively result in deference to the government’s posi-
tion.167 This two-pronged framework for understanding the ways that 
courts defer to agency secrecy decisions helps to reveal the problematic 
attributes of these practices and to identify potential responses. 
A. Spoken Deference 
 Some amount of the deference observed in the 90% affirmance 
rate in FOIA cases can be attributed to courts’ expressly stated, judi-
cially created deference doctrines.168 That is, in litigation involving cer-
tain FOIA exemptions, courts have proclaimed that they owe deference 
to some agency representations relevant to a nondisclosure decision 
despite the de novo review required by the statute.169 This type of def-
                                                                                                                      
166 See infra notes 168–223 and accompanying text. 
167 See infra notes 224–313 and accompanying text. 
168 See Verkuil, supra note 10, at 714–15. Professor Paul Verkuil has conducted an em-
pirical analysis of the effect of deference accorded the government in one subset of the 
cases I group under “spoken deference,” the national security claims made under Exemp-
tion 1, which exempts properly classified records. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006). He 
concludes that although these cases do increase the overall affirmance rate slightly, they 
do not even approach a full explanation of the difference between a hypothesized de novo 
affirmance rate and the observed rate. See Verkuil, supra note 10, at 736–37. Verkuil does 
not, however, explore the full range of stated deference doctrines. 
169 See generally Slegers, supra note 12 (providing examples of cases in which judges 
have stated that they owe deference to agencies’ determinations under FOIA). 
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erence is found in FOIA cases involving three types of claimed agency 
interests: (1) national security, (2) federal law enforcement, and (3) the 
deliberative process privilege.170 
1. National Security 
 National security has historically justified deference to decisions 
made by the political branches of government.171 Agency decisions are 
no exception.172 Under FOIA, courts routinely review government 
claims that records must be withheld from the public for national secu-
rity reasons under an expressly deferential standard.173 
                                                                                                                      
170 I do not include FOIA’s Exemption 3, which covers records exempt from disclosure 
by another statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Because the other non-FOIA statute that 
qualifies under Exemption 3 is often an organic statute that a particular agency is charged 
with administering, some courts, including the D.C. Circuit, have concluded that the 
agency’s interpretation of that other statute is entitled to either Chevron or Skidmore defer-
ence. See, e.g., Landmark Legal Found. v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (apply-
ing Skidmore deference to the Internal Revenue Service’s interpretation of a portion of the 
Internal Revenue Code that specifically exempts taxpayer return information); Lehrfeld v. 
Richardson, 132 F.3d 1463, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying Chevron deference to a De-
partment of the Treasury interpretation, in a regulation, of the same statute); Tax Analysts 
v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same). Other courts, however, have taken the 
approach that an Exemption 3 statute, like other FOIA exemptions, should be narrowly 
construed, and thus, that the traditional administrative law deference doctrines do not 
apply to agencies’ interpretations of those statutes. See A. Michael’s Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 
F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 1994) (detailing the disagreement among the circuits). I am setting 
aside the question of which position is the correct one and the effect of this potentially 
unwarranted deference on the overall affirmance rate, because there are not many FOIA 
cases according deference under Chevron or Skidmore to agency interpretations of Exemp-
tion 3 statutes. 
171 For instance, in Korematsu v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court infamously up-
held the governmental order that Japanese Americans be held in internment camps as 
justified by wartime exigencies. See 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). Although an extreme exam-
ple, invocations of national security justifications commonly get special solicitude from the 
courts. More recently, in Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court confronted an immigration deten-
tion situation in which it declared that although “terrorism or other special circumstances” 
were not present in that case, if they were, “arguments might be made for . . . heightened 
deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national 
security.” 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001). 
172 Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing Field, 90 Or. L. Rev. 583, 585 (2011) 
(arguing that the military continues to enjoy “super-deference,” even though the general 
APA standards apply). 
173 Fuchs, supra note 12, at 163 (“Even when purporting to conduct a de novo review as 
mandated by FOIA, courts have adopted a doctrine of deference to executive claims that 
secrecy is needed to protect national security interests.”). In her article, one commentator 
chronicles the lack of meaningful review of national security claims under FOIA. See id. at 
163–68. 
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 FOIA protects national security interests primarily under Exemp-
tion 1, which exempts records “specifically authorized under criteria 
established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
national defense or foreign policy and . . . are in fact properly classified 
pursuant to such Executive order.”174 This language was adopted in 
1974 to overrule the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in EPA v. Mink, in 
which the Court held that classification decisions by the government 
were not reviewable under FOIA, except to determine if the record was 
in fact classified.175 The new language, paired with a new provision ex-
pressly permitting a court to review withheld records in camera,176 was 
intended to provide the same type of review for classification decisions 
as for other FOIA withholdings by requiring courts to verify that the 
records were in fact properly classified under an executive order. 
 Although the idea that national security concerns uniquely justify a 
heightened level of secrecy is facially appealing, national security ex-
perts have explained that there are many instances in which publicity 
and transparency would increase security, rather than hamper it.177 
When information is kept secret, it is often not shared even in other 
parts of government that might be able to augment the knowledge on 
the subject matter and advance security interests.178 Moreover, an un-
aware public cannot be vigilant or aid in the government’s security ef-
forts.179 Experts have concluded that overclassification itself reduces 
the effectiveness of classification.180 Although legitimate reasons for 
secrecy exist and some amount of information should be protected, 
                                                                                                                      
174 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006). 
175 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81 (1973), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. 
L. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), as recognized in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985); see supra 
notes 94–105 and accompanying text. The language of the original 1966 Act, which was 
considered by the Court in Mink, exempted records “specifically required by Executive 
order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy.” See Mink, 
410 U.S. at 81. 
176 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
177 Fuchs, supra note 12, at 136–39 (citing Emerging Threats: Overclassification and Pseudo-
Classification: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int’l Relations of 
the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of J. William Leonard, Di-
rector, ISOO, National Archives & Records Administration)). 
178 Id. at 136. 
179 Id. at 138 (citing Joint Investigation into September 11th: Hearing Before the J. S. and H. Intel-
ligence Comms., 107th Cong. 1 (2002)) (discussing the congressional testimony that suggested 
that only publicity could have thwarted the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001). 
180 Id. at 139 (citing Info. Sec. Oversight Office, Report to the President 7 
(2002)). 
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Congress rationally can require the executive branch to justify national 
security withholdings as it does other secrecy decisions.181 
 Despite two attempts by Congress to establish de novo judicial re-
view of decisions to withhold records based on national security, courts 
acknowledge outright the deference they afford to claims of national 
security classification.182 As one court explained: 
Courts . . . accord substantial deference to the [agency’s] de-
termination that information must be withheld under Exemp-
tion 1, and will uphold the agency’s decision so long as the 
withheld information ‘logically falls into the category of the 
exemption indicated’ and there is no evidence of bad faith on 
the part of the agency.183 
Another court elaborated, “Even in those instances where the court 
might have its own view of the soundness of the original policy decision 
. . . it must defer to the agency’s evaluation of the need to maintain the 
secrecy of the methods used to carry out such [classified] projects.”184 
Courts are also reluctant to exercise their statutory power to review 
classified records in camera, citing concerns about resource constraints 
and intrusions on the agency.185 
 Courts rationalize the deference given to agency positions under 
Exemption 1 by employing the legislative history of the 1974 amend-
ments, which reveals statements from the amendments’ proponents 
that agencies’ affidavits would carry substantial weight.186 As the U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
 
181 See id. 
182 See, e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 681 F.3d 61, 76 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]his Court 
must adopt a ‘deferential posture in FOIA cases regarding the uniquely executive purview 
of national security.’” (citation omitted)); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 555–56 (1st Cir. 
1993) (stating that courts afford substantial deference to the CIA’s determination that 
information must be withheld under Exemption 1); King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 
210, 217–18 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the court owes substantial weight to detailed 
agency explanations, as set forth in affidavits, in the national security context). 
183 Maynard, 986 F.2d at 555–56 (citations omitted). 
184 Stein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). 
185 Slegers, supra note 12, at 232. 
186 See 120 Cong Rec. 34,167 (1974) (statement of Rep. Moorhead) (“First of all, a 
court could only determine whether the information was ‘properly classified pursuant to 
(an) Executive order.’ In other words, the judge would have to decide whether the docu-
ment met the criteria of the President’s order for classification—not whether he himself 
would have classified the document in accordance with his own ideas of what should be 
kept secret. Second, as we have said in the joint explanatory statement of the committee of 
conference: ‘The conferees expect that Federal courts, in making de novo determinations 
in section 552(b)(1) cases under the Freedom of Information law, will accord substantial 
weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed 
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Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit explained, Congress “emphasized 
that in reaching a de novo determination the judge would accord sub-
stantial weight to detailed agency affidavits and take into account that 
the executive had ‘unique insights into what adverse affects might oc-
cur as a result of public disclosure of a particular classified record.’”187 
Without doubt, this legislative history suggests that some members of 
Congress were concerned that agency expertise not be ignored. 
 Despite what some courts contend,188 according substantial weight 
to an affidavit is not inconsistent with de novo judicial review. Rather, in 
evaluating an exemption claim, a court could easily take agency affida-
vits into account, while still conducting an independent review of all of 
the arguments and evidence before it. But the statute itself does not 
state the weight to be accorded the agency’s affidavit, which would sug-
gest that the affidavit should be treated like any other piece of sum-
mary judgment evidence. And yet, citing legislative history, the D.C. 
Circuit has declared that “Congress has instructed the courts to accord 
‘substantial weight’ to agency affidavits in national security cases.”189 
Not so. The statute prescribes de novo review.190 As the former Vice 
President and General Counsel of the National Security Archive, a 
watchdog group, noted, “In a subtle but telling shift of nomenclature, 
the D.C. Circuit . . . [has] called the standard of review in [national se-
curity] cases ‘the substantial weight standard’ rather than the de novo 
standard of review mandated by Congress.”191 In sum, courts’ reluc-
tance to conduct searching review of claims of exemption based on 
classification cannot be justified on the grounds of legislative history, 
                                                                                                                      
record.’”); see also Slegers, supra note 12, at 227 (acknowledging the legislative history, but 
maintaining that “it is also clear that the role that Congress intended for courts involves 
more than merely approving classifications that appear logical,” as courts have done). 
187 Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-1200, at 
12 (1974)). 
188 See Stein, 662 F.2d at 1253 (“From these statements, it appears that Congress did not 
intend that the courts would make a true de novo review of classified documents, that is, a 
fresh determination of the legitimacy of the classification status of each classified docu-
ment.”). 
189 Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing S. Rep. No. 93-1200, at 12 
(1974)). 
190 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
191 Fuchs, supra note 12, at 165 (citing Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 147–48 (D.C. Cir. 
1980)); see also Christina E. Wells, “National Security” Information and the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 1195, 1208 (2004) (“Most observers agree that courts are gen-
erally deferential to claims of harm to national security, rarely overriding the government’s 
classification decisions. Although purporting to apply de novo review, they effectively apply 
something less.” (footnote omitted)). 
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for the 1974 amendments clearly established a mandate for courts to 
conduct such review de novo.192 
 In addition to Exemption 1, Exemption 3 is often at issue in na-
tional security cases. There, too, the courts have deferred to agencies’ 
nondisclosure decisions. Exemption 3 covers records “specifically ex-
empted from disclosure by statute,”193 and the government often relies 
on the statute that protects from disclosure Central Intelligence Agency 
records reflecting “intelligence sources and methods.”194 The Supreme 
Court has weighed in on the deference debate on sources and meth-
ods, explaining in a leading Exemption 3 case, CIA v. Sims, decided in 
1985, that “[t]he decisions of the Director, who must of course be famil-
iar with ‘the whole picture,’ as judges are not, are worthy of great def-
erence given the magnitude of the national security interests and po-
tential risks at stake.”195 In sum, courts have now fully integrated 
deference into claims regarding national security made under FOIA, 
without any statutory justification. 
2. Law Enforcement 
 Historically, routine law enforcement activities have not enjoyed 
the same privileged legal status as do military and national security mat-
ters. Nonetheless, judicial decisions have given rise to deference in at 
                                                                                                                      
192 Ray, 587 F.2d at 1193 (“The legislative history underscores that the intent of Con-
gress regarding de novo review stood in contrast to, and was a rejection of, the alternative 
suggestion proposed by the Administration and supported by some Senators: that in the 
national security context the court should be limited to determining whether there was a 
reasonable basis for the decision by the appropriate official to withhold the document.”). 
193 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Interestingly, there is an alternative claim that the interpreta-
tion of Exemption 3 statutes, which tend to be statutes on particular subjects and directed 
at particular agencies, are entitled to Chevron deference. See Slegers, supra note 12, at 229 
(suggesting that a different standard of deference seems appropriate for Exemption 3); 
supra note 170. The decisions discussed in this Article, however, do not apply the Chevron 
framework. 
194 National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) (2006) (“The Director of National In-
telligence shall protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.”). 
195 Sims, 471 U.S. at 179. Notably, the deference described in these decisions is not jus-
tified by Chevron or Skidmore principles but rather is created out of whole cloth based on 
the judiciary’s notions of national security interests. See id.; Brent Filbert, Note, Freedom of 
Information Act: CIA v. Sims—The CIA Is Given Broad Powers to Withhold the Identities of Intelli-
gence Sources, 54 UMKC L. Rev. 332, 342 (1986) (arguing that Sims gave the CIA broad dis-
cretion to protect the identities of individuals involved with the CIA’s intelligence opera-
tions under FOIA and the National Security Act of 1947); see also Christina E. Wells, CIA v. 
Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 845, 846 n.6 (2006) (collect-
ing articles by scholars who have criticized Sims for its broad reading of the National Secu-
rity Act). 
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least two different situations when agencies claim records are exempt 
under FOIA due to a law enforcement concerns. 
 Law enforcement interests are protected under FOIA Exemption 
7.196 To demonstrate that this exemption applies, the agency must first 
cross Exemption 7’s threshold requirement that the records were “com-
piled for law enforcement purposes.”197 Both agencies whose principal 
function is law enforcement, such as the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, and agencies that engage in law enforcement activities and other 
administrative functions, such as the Internal Revenue Service, can 
claim this exemption.198 
 The threshold requirement, however, has been interpreted not to 
be the same for all agencies. In considering an agency’s claim that it 
has passed the Exemption 7 threshold, the D.C. Circuit presumes that 
an agency acts within its legislated purpose.199 Agencies whose primary 
function is law enforcement may provide “less exacting proof” that the 
records concern law enforcement.200 By contrast, a court must “scruti-
nize with some skepticism” claims made by mixed-function agencies 
that records were compiled for law enforcement purposes.201 The end 
result, the D.C. Circuit has explained, is that “courts apply a more def-
erential standard to a claim that information was compiled for law en-
                                                                                                                      
196 Exemption 7 exempts from mandatory disclosure 
records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the 
extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) 
could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) 
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) 
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confiden-
tial source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private 
institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case 
of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in 
the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful na-
tional security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confiden-
tial source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement 
investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement 
investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected 
to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endan-
ger the life or physical safety of any individual. 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2006). 
197 Id. 
198 Tax Analysts v. IRS, 294 F.3d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
199 Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
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forcement purposes when the claim is made by an agency whose pri-
mary function involves law enforcement.”202 
 Other circuits have followed the D.C. Circuit’s lead and adopted its 
standard.203 Diverging from the D.C. Circuit, however, is another group 
of circuits that has adopted an even more deferential standard, called 
the “per se” rule.204 Under this rule, “documents compiled by law en-
forcement agencies are inherently records compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes within the meaning of Exemption 7.”205 Accordingly, 
under the per se rule, an agency that is primarily a law enforcement 
agency need not offer any proof at all that records are compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, not even the “less exacting proof” the D.C. Cir-
cuit requires.206 Although longstanding, these deference doctrines are 
nowhere rooted in the statutory text. 
 Deference under Exemption 7 does not end there. After meeting 
the threshold requirement of demonstrating that records were com-
piled for law enforcement purposes, an agency must also demonstrate 
that law enforcement records fall within one of six enumerated catego-
ries.207 The first category covers records the release of which “could 
reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.”208 
In 2003, in Center for National Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice, 
the D.C. Circuit declared that some agency assertions made pertaining 
to this second step of the Exemption 7 analysis are also entitled to def-
erential treatment by the courts.209 The court considered a claim that 
the release of records concerning individuals detained as part of a post-
September 11 investigation would interfere with that investigation.210 
                                                                                                                      
202 Tax Analysts, 294 F.3d at 77. 
203 See, e.g., Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 184–86 (3d Cir. 
2007); Church of Scientology v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1979). 
204 See, e.g., Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2011); Jones 
v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 245–46 (6th Cir. 1994); Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882, 883–86 (2d Cir. 
1984); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, 666–67 (8th Cir. 1980); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 
473–76 (1st Cir. 1979). 
205 Jordan, 668 F.3d at 1193 (quoting Trentadue v. Integrity Comm., 501 F.3d 1215, 
1235 (10th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
206 See id. 
207 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2006); supra note 196 (providing the text of Exemption 7). 
208 Id. § 552(b)(7)(A). 
209 See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 
2003). 
210 Id. The plaintiffs primarily sought the detainees’ names, attorneys, dates of arrest 
and release, locations of arrest and detention, and reasons for detention. Id. at 921. The 
government claimed that release of this information would “enable al Qaeda or other 
terrorist groups to map the course of the investigation and thus develop the means to im-
pede it.” Id. at 928. 
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The court concluded that an agency’s assertion that releasing records 
would harm national security is entitled to the “same deference under 
Exemption 7(A)” as it would receive if the agency were invoking Ex-
emptions 1 or 3, the national security exemptions.211 “Judicial defer-
ence depends on the substance of the danger posed by disclosure—that 
is, harm to the national security—not the FOIA exemption invoked,” 
the D.C. Circuit declared.212 Although that case was limited to en-
forcement proceedings involving national security interests, this repre-
sents the first time that such deference has been granted in the context 
of a routine law enforcement exemption claim.213 Whether courts will 
apply this deference to enforcement proceedings other than national 
security related matters remains to be seen. 
3. Deliberative Process 
 Perhaps the most surprising appearance of spoken deference to 
agency FOIA decisions has occurred when agencies invoke the delib-
erative process privilege under FOIA’s Exemption 5. The deliberative 
process privilege is meant to protect the agency’s decision-making 
process.214 To that end, it exempts from mandatory disclosure records 
that are both predecisional and deliberative.215 Records are considered 
predecisional if they were created before a final decision was reached 
on the records’ subject matter, and are deliberative if they contain 
opinion, recommendation, or policymaking material, rather than fac-
tual accounts.216 
 Deferring to an agency’s determination that the release of records 
would injure its own decision-making process opens the door for an 
agency to claim an exemption for a wide swath of records. Nonetheless, 
at least one district court judge has concluded that some deference is 
warranted.217 Proclaiming that “[t]he [agency] is better situated than 
either [the requester] or this Court to know what confidentiality is 
                                                                                                                      
211 Id. at 928; see supra notes 171–195 and accompanying text. 
212 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 928. 
213 As one scholar has explained, this decision conflicts with courts’ original position 
that deference to national security concerns is “intended for (b)(1) [classification] exemp-
tions only.” Wells, supra note 191, at 1208. 
214 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(5) (2006) (exempting “inter-agency or intra-agency memoran-
dums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litiga-
tion with the agency”); see United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 798–99 (1984). 
215 See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
216 See id. 
217 Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm’n, 600 F. Supp. 114, 118 
(D.D.C. 1984). 
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needed ‘to prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions’ while the 
decision-making process is in progress,” the court concluded that 
“[t]here should be considerable deference to the [agency’s] judgment 
as to what constitutes . . . ‘part of the agency give-and-take—of the de-
liberative process—by which the decision itself is made.’”218 Although 
no precedential opinion has endorsed this type of deference, several 
other district court judges have adopted the same approach.219 
 The potential for agency abuse in claiming the deliberative process 
privilege is particularly troubling because illegitimate agency self-
interest, such as protection from embarrassment, is more likely to be a 
factor in a deliberative process case. Moreover, there is a serious risk of 
“secret law,” that is, agency policies and decisions that affect the public 
but about which the public has no information.220 Preventing secret law 
is at the heart of the purpose of FOIA.221 Again, the deference these 
courts give to agency representations has no statutory basis, and flies in 
the face of the clear statutory command to review de novo all agency 
decisions to withhold records under FOIA. 
 Taken together, the courts’ express deference to agency exemp-
tion claims is substantial. Deference doctrines have crept into parts of 
four of FOIA’s nine statutory exemptions.222 None is based on statutory 
text or reflects congressional intent. Rather, the deference doctrines 
reflect courts’ views on the propriety of second-guessing the executive 
branch in particular circumstances, divorced from the mandate of the 
governing law.223 
                                                                                                                      
218 Id. (citations omitted). 
219 See NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 
07Civ.3378(GEL), 2007 WL 4233008, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2007); Williams v. 
McCausland, No. 90Civ.7563(RWS), 1994 WL 18510, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1994); Rollins 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. Civ.A. H–90–3170, 1992 WL 12014526, at *8 (S.D. Tex. June 30, 
1992); Pfeiffer v. CIA, 721 F. Supp. 337, 340 (D.D.C. 1989). 
220 See Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 617 (“A strong theme of our [deliberative process] opin-
ions is that an agency will not be permitted to develop a body of ‘secret law.’”); Assembly of 
Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (1992) (“Because an agency’s interpreta-
tions of its decisions often become the ‘working law’ of the agency, documents deemed 
‘postdecisional’ do not enjoy the protection of the deliberative process privilege. This insures 
that the agency does not operate on the basis of ‘secret law.’” (citations omitted)). 
221 See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 598 F.3d 865, 872 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (“As we have repeatedly explained, FOIA provides no protection for such ‘secret 
law’ developed and implemented by an agency.”). 
222 See supra notes 168–223 and accompanying text. 
223 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006); supra notes 120–165 and accompanying text. 
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B. Unspoken Deference 
 In addition to instances where courts develop deferential standards 
of review for particular questions under FOIA, in almost every FOIA 
case, special procedures have effectively resulted in deference to the 
government’s claimed need for secrecy.224 In these instances, courts 
have developed procedures unique to FOIA litigation that weigh in fa-
vor of the government’s nondisclosure position. These neutral-sounding 
procedural rules sometimes appear sensible and benign. Both individu-
ally and especially cumulatively, however, these devices have an even 
greater effect in rubber-stamping government secrecy decisions than 
the spoken deference categories discussed above because they apply in 
every litigated FOIA case. 
 To understand how these practices came about, it is necessary to 
consider how FOIA cases are typically litigated. Unlike in most other 
civil litigation, FOIA expressly provides that the defendant (i.e., the 
government) bears the burden to prove that an exemption to disclo-
sure applies.225 Also, unlike other civil litigation, there is an inherent 
information imbalance between the parties because the government 
knows the contents of the records that have been requested, whereas 
the FOIA plaintiff almost always does not.226 Moreover, the govern-
ment’s knowledge about the records’ creation and use, and the likely 
effect of the release of the record on private, public, or national inter-
ests, is often far greater than the knowledge held by FOIA plaintiffs, if 
not exclusive.227 Thus, although the government bears the burden of 
proof, it also holds almost all of the information relevant to meeting 
that burden. 
 Because of these peculiarities, courts have sometimes concluded 
that the typical adversarial process cannot apply in the same way as in 
other civil litigation, and thus special procedures are needed in FOIA 
cases.228 These special processes sometimes have arisen from an at-
tempt to help requesters themselves navigate the difficult litigation 
                                                                                                                      
224 See infra notes 225–313 and accompanying text. 
225 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (“[T]he burden is on the agency to sustain its action.”). 
226 Information imbalances in other civil litigation are, of course, designed to be equal-
ized through the discovery process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (making discoverable any non-
privileged information relevant to any party’s claim or defense); see also infra notes 243–
271 and accompanying text (discussing discovery issues unique to FOIA cases). 
227 Although discovery could potentially remedy this imbalance, judicial decisions have 
rendered it ineffective in the FOIA context. See infra notes 243–271 and accompanying text. 
228 See, e.g., Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“This lack of knowl-
edge by the party seeking disclosure seriously distorts the traditional adversary nature of 
our legal system’s form of dispute resolution.”). 
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landscape, but they often thwart any real possibility of challenging the 
government’s factual assertions and undermine the statutory require-
ment that the government justify its withholding decisions. Although 
these FOIA-specific procedural practices are interrelated, I categorize 
them into four groups.229 
1. Vaughn Index 
 The Vaughn index is the most famous FOIA-specific procedural 
device. It arose early in FOIA’s history, when, in 1973, the D.C. Circuit 
decided Vaughn v. Rosen.230 As the court explained, the Vaughn index 
procedure was designed to remedy the information imbalance inherent 
in FOIA lawsuits: “In light of this overwhelming emphasis upon disclo-
sure, it is anomalous but obviously inevitable that the party with the 
greatest interest in obtaining disclosure is at a loss to argue with desir-
able legal precision for the revelation of the concealed information.”231 
In this regard, the court then noted that, in contemporary FOIA litiga-
tion, the government typically was permitted to “aver that the factual 
nature of the information is such that it falls under one of the exemp-
tions. . . . [and then] the opposing party [was] comparatively helpless 
to controvert this characterization.”232 
 The D.C. Circuit first considered requiring routine in camera re-
view of records, but concluded that such review would overburden 
courts and would fail to remedy the plaintiff’s inability to test the gov-
ernment’s exemption claim.233 The court then turned to Supreme 
Court precedent that generally described detailed affidavits or oral tes-
timony as the basis for establishing the government’s entitlement to 
withhold records under FOIA.234 From there, the D.C. Circuit created 
the Vaughn index procedure as a remedy to the information imbalance. 
The court required the government to separate the withheld materials, 
index the withholdings, and provide a separate justification for each 
withheld record or separate section thereof.235 It also required that the 
justification be a “relatively detailed analysis in manageable seg-
                                                                                                                      
229 See infra notes 230–313 and accompanying text. 
230 Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 823. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 825–26. 
233 Id. at 825. 
234 See id. at 826 (citing Mink, 410 U.S. at 93). 
235 Id. at 827. 
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ments.”236 These requirements in many ways parallel the privilege logs 
required in civil discovery.237 
 The D.C. Circuit undoubtedly created the Vaughn index to better 
achieve FOIA’s maximum disclosure goals and to promote genuine 
testing of government FOIA exemption claims.238 In theory, the Vaughn 
index process should help combat the information imbalance problem 
in FOIA litigation.239 The Vaughn index implementation, however, has 
revealed deep deficiencies. Now, it is often more of a hindrance than a 
help to requesters. These deficiencies are primarily threefold. First, 
Vaughn indices have become so boilerplate that they are often not of 
great use to test the government’s claims.240 Second, as a result of these 
boilerplate indices, FOIA litigation often focuses on a dispute about the 
adequacy of the Vaughn index, rather than a dispute about the merits of 
the exemption claims themselves—that is, parties contest whether the 
Vaughn index provides sufficient detail about documents instead of 
contesting whether a document falls within a claimed exemption.241 
Finally, and perhaps most seriously, the creation of the Vaughn proce-
dure has been used to justify denying FOIA plaintiffs any additional 
discovery as normally permitted in civil cases242 discussed further be-
low. Given the limited assistance the Vaughn index provides to most 
                                                                                                                      
236 Vaughan, 484 F.2d at 826. 
237 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) (describing how to claim a privilege in civil discovery). 
238 See Vaughan, 484 F.2d at 823–24. 
239 Notably, even assuming the Vaughn index were a useful tool, courts have whittled 
away at requiring its use, finding more and more categories of cases for which a Vaughn 
index is unnecessary. See, e.g., Fiduccia v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 185 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 
1999) (holding that a Vaughn index is not required when it is not needed to restore the 
traditional adversarial process); Crancer v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 999 F.2d 1302, 1316 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (en banc) (holding that a Vaughn index is not required when documents are 
categorically exempt); Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(holding that a Vaughn index was unnecessary for information obtained from a confiden-
tial source during a law enforcement investigation because application of the exemption 
did not depend on the contents of the records). 
240 See Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over National 
Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 67, 100 (1992) (pro-
viding examples of how the government minimizes disclosure while appearing to describe 
documents, and thereby fails to allow plaintiffs to formulate meaningful contrary argu-
ments or to assist the court in resolving FOIA disputes); see also Fuchs, supra note 12, at 172 
(“When courts expect detail, agencies can deliver. When courts are unwilling to insist on a 
serious specification and indexing of exemption claims, by contrast, agencies take the easy 
route of relying on boilerplate justifications.”). 
241 See Deyling, supra note 240, at 73. The fault for this phenomenon certainly lies, at 
least in part, in plaintiffs’ strategic choice to challenge the Vaughn index rather than to 
simply challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the government’s exemption 
claim on summary judgment. 
242 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37, 45. 
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FOIA plaintiffs, the procedure’s biggest failure may be that it has cur-
tailed meaningful discovery. 
2. Discovery 
 The courts’ general failure to allow discovery in FOIA cases is itself 
a form of deference to the government. As the D.C. Circuit has ac-
knowledged, the Federal Rules, which govern the discovery process, 
apply with equal force to, and provide no exemption for, FOIA cases.243 
The Federal Rules govern the procedure in federal district courts in all 
civil suits with limited exceptions that do not encompass FOIA cases.244 
As a result, the standard discovery tools—including interrogatories, 
requests for admission, requests for production, and depositions—are 
all formally available.245 
 District courts certainly have great discretion to control discovery 
in all civil litigation.246 As one prominent proceduralist has noted, 
there is “a virtual riot of discretion” exercised by district courts in apply-
ing the Federal Rules.247 Indeed, district courts retain this “broad dis-
cretion to manage the scope of discovery” in FOIA cases as well.248 
 This discretion, however, has not been exercised on a case-by-case 
basis, as the Federal Rules envision. Courts instead have systematically 
eliminated discovery procedures in FOIA cases. In a repeated mantra, 
district courts have proclaimed that “[d]iscovery is generally unavail-
                                                                                                                      
243 See Weisberg v. Webster, 749 F.2d 864, 867–68 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The only possible 
exception to full discovery for FOIA cases is that FOIA cases could be construed as actions 
for “review on an administrative record,” thereby relieving the parties of initial disclosure 
requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B); Pohl v. EPA, No. 09-1480, 2010 WL 786918, 
at *3 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010) (noting the government’s position that initial disclosures 
are not required in FOIA cases). Although this construction seems a stretch because FOIA 
cases produce no true administrative record and the record is not closed at the administra-
tive level, even this exemption from initial disclosures would have no effect on active dis-
covery requests and the parties’ obligations to respond. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B) 
(exempting only initial disclosure requirements). In addition, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia has adopted a local rule that exempts FOIA cases from initial 
disclosures, though the basis for that rule is unclear, and no other district court has fol-
lowed its lead. See D.D.C. LCvR 16.3, 26.2. 
244 See Weisberg, 749 F.2d at 867; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, 81 (defining the scope and 
applicability of the Federal Rules). 
245 See Weisberg, 749 F.2d at 868; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37 (providing the discovery 
devices available under the Federal Rules). 
246 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 699–700 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
247 Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting 
the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 Denv. U. L. Rev. 377, 384 (2010). 
248 SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see Whitfield v. 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 255 Fed. App’x 533, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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able in FOIA actions,”249 or that “[t]ypically, discovery is not part of a 
FOIA case.”250 Another court has observed that “[d]iscovery is usually 
not permitted in a FOIA case if the government’s affidavits were made 
in good faith and provide specific detail about the methods used to 
produce the information.”251 
 In 1978, Judge David Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit made the first se-
rious attempt to address the question of discovery in FOIA cases, in a 
dissent in Goland v. CIA.252 He began with the unremarkable proposition 
that “[w]ithout discovery, a party to litigation may not have access to 
facts necessary to oppose a motion for summary judgment.”253 Judge 
Bazelon argued that although there was no contrary evidence demon-
strating that the CIA’s response to a FOIA request was inadequate or in 
bad faith, no such evidence could be produced without according the 
plaintiff the opportunity to take discovery.254 In considering the effect 
of the Vaughn index procedure on the availability of discovery, Judge 
Bazelon noted that the plaintiff in Vaughn had not attempted to use dis-
covery, and thus the sole issue before the court in Vaughn was whether 
the agency affidavits were sufficient to demonstrate that the claimed ex-
emptions applied.255 Accordingly, the Vaughn index was designed to test 
the government’s statutory burden, not to replace the default system of 
discovery under the Federal Rules.256 
 Judge Bazelon’s reasoning, however, did not carry the day. The 
presumption that a Vaughn index is sufficient to meet discovery needs 
has rendered other discovery nearly unavailable. In 1996, the Ninth 
Circuit, in Minier v. CIA, offered a typical statement of the impact of 
Vaughn indices on discovery when it declared that “Vaughn indices are 
                                                                                                                      
249 Wheeler v. CIA, 271 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D.D.C. 2003); see also People for the Am. 
Way Found. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 503 F. Supp. 2d 284, 308 (D.D.C. 2007) (“FOIA actions 
typically do not involve discovery.” (citation omitted)). 
250 Schiller v. INS, 205 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (W.D. Tex. 2002); see also Rugiero v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 257 F.3d 534, 544 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that “district courts typically 
dispose of FOIA cases by summary judgment before the plaintiff can conduct discovery”). 
251 Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 
1131 (N.D. Cal. 2008); see also Raher v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 03:09-CV-00526-ST, 2011 
WL 4832574, at *6 (D. Or. Oct. 12, 2011) (“Discovery is sparingly granted in FOIA cases and 
only when an agency has not taken sufficient steps to find responsive documents”) (citing 
Lawyers’ Committee, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1131–32); Schulze v. FBI, No. 1:05-cv-00180, 2011 WL 
129716, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011) (citing Lawyers’ Committee for the proposition that 
FOIA cases are typically decided on summary judgment without discovery). 
252 Goland, 607 F.2d at 357 n.2 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). 
253 Id. at 357. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at 357 n.2. 
256 Id. at 358. 
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sometimes necessary because ordinary rules of discovery cannot be fol-
lowed in FOIA cases where the issue is whether one party is entitled to 
non-disclosed documents.”257 The court, however, never explained why 
the ordinary rules of discovery cannot be followed. 
 One rationale for restricting discovery seems facially appealing but 
fails to withstand scrutiny. Courts have concluded that discovery in a 
FOIA case is inappropriate because the litigation is solely about the re-
lease of records, and courts often assume any discovery would concern 
the content of the requested records themselves.258 Requesting discov-
ery of the very records that were sought originally under FOIA would 
be an inappropriate use of discovery in a FOIA case, and there is no 
serious suggestion to the contrary.259 Proper discovery requests in FOIA 
cases, however, concern facts external to the records themselves, which 
are nonetheless highly relevant to a given claim of exemption. For in-
stance, discovery concerning how the records were created, what the 
records’ intended use was, and with whom the records were shared are 
key inquiries in analyzing a claim that the deliberative process privilege 
exempts records from disclosure.260 Likewise, the amount of competi-
tion a company faces, the measures it uses to guard against release of 
                                                                                                                      
257 Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 1996); see Wood v. FBI, 432 F.3d 78, 85 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (“[D]iscovery relating to the agency’s search and the exemptions it claims for 
withholding records generally is unnecessary if the agency’s submissions are adequate on 
their face.” (citation omitted)). 
258 See City & Cnty. of Honolulu v. EPA, No. 08-00404, 2009 WL 973154 (D. Haw. Apr. 9, 
2009). 
259 Id. In City and County of Honolulu v. EPA, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Hawaii noted that discovery is limited in FOIA cases “because the underlying case revolves 
around the propriety of revealing certain documents” and that it is doubly inappropriate 
to grant discovery where the request “consist[s] of precisely what defendants maintain is 
exempt from disclosure to plaintiff pursuant to the FOIA.” Id. at *1 (citation omitted). In 
another case, the Ninth Circuit noted, disapprovingly, that the plaintiff appeared to be 
requesting in discovery “the very information that is the subject of the FOIA complaint.” 
Lane v. Dep’t of the Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Simmons v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 796 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1986) (denying discovery because it “ap-
pear[ed] largely to be an attempt to . . . learn the contents of the requested documents”); 
Pollard v. FBI, 705 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1983) (denying a deposition concerning the 
contents of the withheld documents because the deposition would reveal precisely what 
the defendants maintained was exempt from disclosure); Driggers v. United States, No. 
3:11-CV-0229-N, 2011 WL 2883283, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2011) (“Here, Plaintiff’s dis-
covery seeks detailed information from the withheld records . . . [and] would essentially 
provide the relief he seeks through this lawsuit.”); Schulze, 2011 WL 129716, at *3 (denying 
discovery because “[p]laintiff’s request relates to the very information that is the subject of 
his FOIA complaint”). 
260 Kwoka, supra note 146, at 236–37; see also Coastal States Gas, 617 F.2d at 868 (noting, 
for example, that the identity of the parties to a memorandum is important in determin-
ing whether a record was predecisional or post-decisional). 
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particular information, and who is given access to that information are 
all relevant to an analysis of a claim that records are confidential com-
mercial or financial information.261 In fact, the majority of disputes of 
fact in FOIA cases are disputes not about the contents of the records, 
but about the circumstances surrounding them.262 Evidence concern-
ing these facts would be appropriately subject to discovery and would 
not reveal the content of the requested record. 
 Other courts have not gone as far as to ban discovery completely, 
but have adopted a standard by which plaintiffs are unable to access the 
tools of discovery at a normal stage in the litigation process and instead 
are required to wait until after summary judgment, if the case survives 
that long. These courts explain that because “[g]enerally, FOIA cases 
should be handled on motions for summary judgment . . . . [a] plain-
tiff’s early attempt in litigation . . . to take discovery depositions is inap-
propriate until the government has first had a chance to provide the 
court with the information necessary to make a decision on the appli-
cable exemptions.”263 This rule is particularly troubling because sum-
mary judgment is the presumptive method for resolution of a FOIA 
case, with less than one percent of FOIA cases being resolved at trial.264 
Thus, virtually no plaintiff will benefit from this potential opportunity 
for discovery. 
 A final circumstance courts sometimes identify as warranting dis-
covery is when a FOIA plaintiff can demonstrate the agency’s bad 
faith.265 By contrast, discovery is not warranted “when it appears that 
discovery would only . . . afford[ ] [the plaintiff] an opportunity to pur-
sue a ‘bare hope of falling upon something that might impugn the affi-
davits.’”266 As Judge Bazelon pointed out, however, a plaintiff will likely 
                                                                                                                      
261 See Kwoka, supra note 146, at 236–37. 
262 Id. 
263 Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993); see Taylor v. Babbitt, 673 F. Supp. 2d 
20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Postponing discovery until the government has submitted its disposi-
tive motion and supporting documents allows the court to obtain information necessary to 
appropriately limit the scope of discovery or forgo it entirely.”); Murphy v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 
1134, 1137 (D.D.C. 1980) (“[A] factual issue that is properly the subject of discovery [in a 
FOIA case] can arise only after the government files its affidavits and supporting memoran-
dum of law.”). 
264 Kwoka, supra note 146, at 258 (calculating the percentage of FOIA trials during the 
period between 1979 and 2008); see Miscavige, 2 F.3d at 369 (“Generally, FOIA cases should 
be handled on motions for summary judgment, once the documents in issue are properly 
identified.”); infra notes 272–289 and accompanying text. 
265 See Jones, 41 F.3d at 242. 
266 Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 751–52 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Found-
ing Church of Scientology v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 610 F.2d 824, 837 n.101 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
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have no way of demonstrating an agency’s bad faith, or impugning the 
affidavits, unless discovery is available.267 Thus, this rule, too, places the 
plaintiff in a classic catch-22. 
 In an ironic twist, one of the most prominent FOIA cases to allow 
discovery was Weisberg v. Webster, in which the D.C. Circuit in 1984 per-
mitted the government to use discovery to obtain information held by the 
requester.268 Although “in the usual FOIA case, the government will be in 
possession of all such evidence” concerning the adequacy of its own 
search, the requester was a devoted researcher of the issues pertaining 
to the request who, the court concluded, had greater knowledge of the 
records than the government.269 If ever a discovery rule seemed lop-
sided, this case seems to have announced one. The court granted dis-
covery to the government-defendant, not the requester-plaintiff.270 Al-
though unusual because discovery was granted, this case exemplifies the 
norm in FOIA lawsuits: FOIA plaintiffs are almost uniformly unable to 
access the tools of discovery to gather evidence that could support their 
case or impeach the government’s withholding claims.271 
3. Summary Judgment 
 Summary judgment is unusually central to the FOIA litigation 
process. Under the Federal Rules, summary judgment in a civil case is 
used to preview trial and resolve pure questions of law and cases with 
no genuine disputes of material fact.272 If there is a dispute of fact that 
may affect the outcome of the case, summary judgment is inappropri-
ate and the case proceeds to trial.273 
                                                                                                                      
267 See Goland, 607 F.2d at 357 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). 
268 See Weisberg, 749 F.2d at 868. 
269 Id. In this case, the plaintiff sought information from the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI) regarding the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. Id. at 856–66. The FBI complied and released over 200,000 pages of docu-
ments. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the FBI’s search was inadequate, and the FBI sought 
discovery as to the basis of these claims. Id. at 866. Noting that the plaintiff-requester had 
spent twenty years researching these issues, the court concluded that it was “entirely possi-
ble that the individual members of the agency . . . [were] not as astute or as knowledgeable 
as to what they have in their files as the plaintiff-requester.” Id. at 868. 
270 See id. 
271 See supra notes 243–271 and accompanying text. 
272 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
273 See id. Plaintiffs bringing cases under FOIA do not have a constitutional or statutory 
right to a jury trial, and therefore these cases proceed to bench trial. See Lehman v. Nak-
shian, 453 U.S. 156, 169 (1981) (holding that the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Consti-
tution does not apply to claims against the United States because of sovereign immunity); 
see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (lacking a statutory provision for jury trial). 
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 Courts have uniquely applied summary judgment in FOIA litiga-
tion.274 Almost uniformly, courts have declared that, “generally, FOIA 
cases should be handled on motions for summary judgment, once the 
documents in issue are properly identified”275 or even that “[a]s a gen-
eral rule, all FOIA determinations should be resolved on summary 
judgment.”276 The underlying assumption is that FOIA cases turn only 
on legal questions, the only facts at issue being the contents of the re-
quested records, which cannot be disputed, and thus that resolution at 
the summary judgment stage is appropriate.277 
 This assumption is incorrect. The application of FOIA’s exemp-
tions turns on factual inquiries. For instance, Exemption 6 covers re-
cords the release of which would likely cause an “unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy.”278 This determination requires predictive inquiries 
as to, on the one hand, the effect of the release on an individual or 
group of individuals, and, on the other hand, whether the release of 
the records will contribute to the public’s understanding of the opera-
tions and activities of the government.279 These inquiries require find-
ings unrelated to the content of the records themselves, such as what 
knowledge on the topic is already public and how a record might be 
used for nefarious purposes. These facts are often in dispute in a FOIA 
case. As a result, the assumption that summary judgment is an appro-
priate vehicle for resolving FOIA cases is unwarranted. 
 Instead of acknowledging these factual disputes and ordering tri-
als, however, courts end up resolving factual disputes at the summary 
                                                                                                                      
274 See Kwoka, supra note 146, at 244–49 (describing the use of summary judgment in 
FOIA cases). 
275 Miscavige, 2 F.3d at 369; see Wickwire Gavin, P.C. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 356 F.3d 588, 
591 (4th Cir. 2004) (“FOIA cases are generally resolved on summary judgment . . . .”); 
Cooper Cameron Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 280 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Sum-
mary judgment resolves most FOIA cases . . . .” (citing Miscavige); see also ACLU v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“If an agency’s affidavit describes the 
justifications for withholding the information with specific detail, demonstrates that the 
information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and is not contradicted 
by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the agency’s bad faith, then summary 
judgment is warranted on the basis of the affidavit alone.”). 
276 Lawyers’ Committee, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1131 (emphasis added). 
277 Kwoka, supra note 146, at 227. 
278 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). 
279 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7)(C) (2006); see U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. 
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989); see also Kwoka, supra note 146, at 227–
44 (providing a detailed analysis of the distinctions between factual and legal questions in 
FOIA cases). 
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judgment stage.280 Often, the weighing of evidence and resolution of 
factual questions is evident in the summary judgment opinions them-
selves.281 In addition, empirical evidence demonstrates that FOIA cases 
are being treated differently from other civil cases. Because FOIA cases 
may present myriad factual disputes, presumably they should result in 
trials at a rate similar to other civil litigation. In reality, although the 
trial rate in civil cases has been slowly falling—with trials occurring in 
approximately 3% of civil cases—the trial rate in FOIA cases remains 
far lower.282 In the years between 1979 and 2008, the trial rate in FOIA 
cases averaged less than 1%, and in the last ten years, there have been 
almost none.283 Additionally, about 12% of non-FOIA civil cases have 
been resolved by motion, whereas about 38% of FOIA cases are re-
solved by motion.284 
 The oddity of resolving factual disputes at the summary judgment 
stage has not gone unnoticed by the courts of appeals. Although tradi-
tionally a summary judgment decision is reviewed de novo by a court of 
appeals because it involves only questions of law, there is a split among 
the circuits as to the appropriate standard of review for summary 
judgment decisions in FOIA cases.285 Six circuits maintain the de novo 
standard,286 but five others have adopted varying articulations of a two-
tiered standard of review under which the court of appeals reviews the 
district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de 
                                                                                                                      
280 See Kwoka, supra note 146, at 238–40 (contending that in some FOIA cases, judges 
decide factual disputes at the summary judgment stage); Rebecca Silver, Comment, Stan-
dard of Review in FOIA Appeals and the Misuse of Summary Judgment, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 731, 
732 (2006) (same). 
281 See, e.g., Access Reports v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(reasoning, under the deliberative process privilege, that although some evidence tended 
to show that the requested report was post-decisional because it explained a legislative 
proposal that was already adopted, other evidence demonstrated the report was prepared 
to defend against anticipated public attacks, and concluding that the latter evidence was 
more persuasive, and thus that the exemption applied). 
282 Kwoka, supra note 146, at 256–60 (cataloging rates of FOIA trials over a thirty-year 
period). 
283 Id. at 258. 
284 Id. at 260. 
285 See id. at 261–64 (describing the split in detail); Silver, supra note 280, at 735–40 
(same). 
286 See, e.g., Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2009); Mo. Coal. for 
the Env’t Found. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 542 F.3d 1204, 1209 (8th Cir. 2008); Forest 
Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 416 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2005); Assassination 
Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. 
v. United States, 138 F.3d 1075, 1078 (6th Cir. 1998); Church of Scientology Int’l v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 30 F.3d 224, 228 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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novo,287 essentially acknowledging that fact-finding occurs at the sum-
mary judgment stage in FOIA cases. 
 The effect of resolving questions of fact at the summary judgment 
stage on the ability of FOIA plaintiffs to make their case is likely quite 
significant. Trials provide the opportunity for lawyers to focus a court’s 
attention on the important points in a case in a way not often achiev-
able in papers alone. Trials also provide the requester an opportunity 
to cross-examine government witnesses and to test the truth of their 
assertions, and provide a chance for meaningful discovery.288 Without 
the chance to see a government witness and assess his or her credibility 
under cross-examination, a district court is likely to view government 
affidavits as virtually unassailable and accept the affidavits as credible 
and true.289 
4. Do-Overs 
 FOIA procedure also uniquely favors the government by giving it a 
second bite at the apple when it fails to meet its burden in the initial 
briefing. Typically, FOIA cases are decided not just on one party’s mo-
tion for summary judgment, but on the government’s and the re-
quester’s cross-motions for summary judgment. As described above, 
courts have presumed that these motions are the appropriate vehicles 
for resolving FOIA cases.290 Deferential treatment to the government 
occurs under two scenarios described in detail below.291 First, the gov-
ernment receives procedural deference when the court concludes that 
neither motion should be granted, but rather than proceeding to trial, 
gives the government extra time to marshal its case and an opportunity 
to file a new motion for summary judgment.292 Second, the court de-
fers to the government’s position when the court concludes that the 
                                                                                                                      
287 See, e.g., Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 275–76 (4th Cir. 
2010); Lane, 523 F.3d at 1135 (9th Cir.); News-Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 489 
F.3d 1173, 1189 (11th Cir. 2007); Solar Sources, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1033, 1038 
(7th Cir. 1998); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993). The Fifth 
Circuit has not declared its position. See FlightSafety Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
326 F.3d 607, 610–11 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 
288 Kwoka, supra note 146, at 273–76 (interviewing attorneys who have conducted 
FOIA trials). Empirical evidence, while scant, also suggests meaningful benefits to FOIA 
plaintiffs from trial proceedings. Id. at 264–67. 
289 See id. at 244–46; see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank, 108 F. Supp. 2d 
19, 25 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that “[o]nce a court determines [in a FOIA case] that the 
[government’s] affidavits are sufficient, no further inquiry into their veracity is required”). 
290 See supra notes 272–289 and accompanying text. 
291 See infra notes 292–313 and accompanying text. 
292 See infra notes 304–308 and accompanying text. 
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government failed to meet its burden of producing sufficient evidence 
from which the trier of fact could find in its favor on the claimed ex-
emption, but gives the government leave to gather more evidence and 
thereafter to file a new motion for summary judgment, rather than 
granting summary judgment to the requester.293 
 To understand how these practices constitute deviations from typi-
cal litigation, consider first how a FOIA case would work if the normal 
rules of procedure applied. To begin, the government bears the bur-
den of proof to demonstrate that a FOIA exemption applies, and thus 
to justify the withholding.294 Although it is highly unusual for a defen-
dant to bear the burden at the summary judgment stage, Congress ex-
pressly allocated the burden to the defendant in FOIA cases.295 As a 
result, the government’s task at the summary judgment stage should be 
substantially more difficult than the plaintiff’s. To win a motion for 
summary judgment, a party who bears the burden of proof—here, the 
government—must demonstrate evidence on every element of the 
claim and that there is no genuine issue of material fact on any element 
of the claim such that a trier of fact could only find in favor of the mov-
ing party.296 Put another way, the party who does not bear the burden 
of proof (the requester in a FOIA case) should defeat a summary 
judgment motion simply by demonstrating some contrary evidence 
such that there is a genuine issue of material fact that must be tried.297 
By contrast, a party that does not bear the burden of proof may win his 
or her own summary judgment motion merely by demonstrating a lack 
of sufficient evidence to find for the defendant on a single essential 
element of the claim.298 
 For instance, in the FOIA context, if the government were claim-
ing that records were exempt under the deliberative process privilege 
recognized under Exemption 5,299 it would have to demonstrate that 
the records were (1) inter- or intra-agency; (2) predecisional; and (3) 
                                                                                                                      
293 See infra notes 309–313 and accompanying text. 
294 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006)(“[T]he burden is on the agency to sustain its ac-
tion.”). 
295 Id. 
296 See Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judg-
ment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 81, 119–21 (2006); see also 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (articulating the summary judgment standard). 
297 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 
298 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). 
299 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). 
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deliberative.300 If the plaintiff moves for summary judgment, points to 
the Vaughn index, and explains how the Vaughn index provides a lack of 
evidence that the records were deliberative, this should be sufficient to 
prevail on summary judgment.301 On the other hand, if the govern-
ment moves for summary judgment, it must demonstrate sufficient evi-
dence in its Vaughn index on each of those three elements.302 Even 
then, the plaintiff could defeat the motion by producing enough evi-
dence to create a genuine dispute on any single element.303 
 But cross-motions for summary judgment in FOIA cases do not 
proceed this way. Instead, when a court concludes that the government 
has failed to produce evidence to support an essential element of the 
exemption claim, rather than grant the plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment, a court often denies both motions with an explicit option for 
the government to refile with more evidence.304 In one case, where the 
court denied summary judgment to both parties on an Exemption 5 
claim, the court ordered the agency to “submit a new Vaughn Index as 
to these documents with proper detailed document descriptions and 
reasons for withholding that illuminate the contents of the documents 
and the reasons for nondisclosure.”305 In another case, the court oddly 
“partially granted” the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the 
issue of the inadequate Vaughn index, but then denied both motions 
for summary judgment on the exemption claims on the basis that the 
court could not make a determination about the exemptions without 
an adequate Vaughn index.306 These cases abound.307 
                                                                                                                      
 
300 See Mink, 410 U.S. at 89. Although it is unusual to talk about “elements” of a FOIA 
claim, as they typically are not defined as such, the components of a given exemption es-
sentially function as elements because all or a certain number must be met for the exemp-
tion to apply. 
301 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. 
302 See id. 
303 See id. 
304 See infra note 307 (collecting cases). 
305 Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v. U.S. Coast Guard, No. Civ.A.04-1724(CKK), 
2006 WL 696053, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2006). 
306 Elec. Frontier Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 826 F. Supp. 2d. 157, 175 (D.D.C. 
2011). 
307 See, e.g., Clemente v. FBI, 741 F. Supp. 2d 64, 89 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding the govern-
ment’s evidence inadequate, denying both parties’ motions for summary judgment, and 
ordering the government to file a more adequate Vaughn index); Schoenman v. FBI, 604 F. 
Supp. 2d 174, 204 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying both parties’ motions for summary judgment and 
ordering the government to produce a more specific Vaughn index); NYC Apparel FZE v. 
U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. Civ.A. 04-2105(RBW), 2006 WL 167833, at *36 (D.D.C. Jan. 
23, 2006) (denying without prejudice the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, or-
dering the government to submit to the court a more specific Vaughn index and “any addi-
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 It is difficult to imagine any other circumstance in which a court 
would not grant summary judgment against a party which clearly failed 
to meet its burden of production on an essential element of the claim. 
District courts often have the discretion to allow a plaintiff to refile with 
more or better evidence than she produced in the first round.308 The 
routinization of this practice, however, appears to be unique to FOIA 
cases, and only benefits the government. 
 In one striking case, a requester challenged the Bureau of Prisons’ 
(BOP) invocation of Exemption 7, which covers certain law enforce-
ment records.309 At the summary judgment stage, cross-motions con-
tested whether BOP had met its burden to prove the threshold re-
quirement to demonstrate that the records were compiled for law 
enforcement purposes.310 The court explained that “[t]he BOP’s sup-
porting declaration neither identifies a particular individual or incident 
subject to an investigation nor connects a particular individual or inci-
dent to a potential violation of law.”311 As a result, BOP did not meet its 
burden to produce evidence supporting the threshold requirement of 
                                                                                                                      
tional declarations” regarding the claimed exemptions, and thereby inviting renewed mo-
tions for summary judgment); Edmonds Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 383 F. Supp. 2d 
105, 111 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding that the agency’s Vaughn index was not sufficiently detailed, 
but that the requestor was not entitled to a declaratory judgment that the agency acted con-
trary to law, and ordering the government to submit a more specific Vaughn index after 
which renewed motions for summary judgment would be considered); Queen v. Reno, No. 
Civ.A. 96-1387( JAR), 2005 WL 762087, at *10 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2005) (denying both parties’ 
motions for summary judgment while ordering the government to produce a supplemental 
Vaughn index and inviting the parties to renew their motions thereafter); Campaign for Re-
sponsible Transplantation v. FDA, 219 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding the 
agency’s Vaughn indices inadequate and ordering the government to submit a more specific 
index, after which renewed motions for summary judgment would be considered); Sousa v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civ. Nos. 95-375, 95-410, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18627, at *32 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 9, 1996) (denying both parties’ motions for summary judgment, granting the govern-
ment sixty days to submit an amended Vaughn index and any additional affidavits, and grant-
ing an additional thirty days to refile the motion for summary judgment). 
308 To begin, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) only states that courts “shall” grant 
summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is a dispute in the case law as to whether 
the word “shall” gives district courts discretion to deny summary judgment when there 
appears to be no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the rules committee has de-
clined to change the word “shall” to the more clearly mandatory “must” that the new style 
of rules drafting uses for fear of eliminating existing discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 
committee’s note (2010 amend.). Perhaps even more importantly, Rule 56(d) also permits 
a court to defer ruling or deny a motion where a party demonstrates that there was insuffi-
cient opportunity to gather evidence. This situation is not likely directly applicable to the 
government in a FOIA case, which chooses when to file the motion and controls the rele-
vant evidence, but allowing refiling is likely within the district court’s authority. 
309 Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 774 F. Supp. 2d 141, 145 (D.D.C. 2011). 
310 Id. at 146. 
311 Id. at 147. 
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Exemption 7.312 Rather than grant summary judgment to the plaintiff, 
who won the contested issue, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion 
without any invitation to refile (although the opportunity was not yet 
foreclosed by the scheduling order), and then, in denying that portion 
of BOP’s motion, specified that the denial was “without prejudice.”313 
Thus, in the court’s view, only the government should get a second bite 
at the apple. 
 The consequence of this practice is clear. The government need 
not put its best foot forward in its first round of papers. If it fails to win 
with its initial try, it will usually get another chance. If the usual sum-
mary judgment standard were applied, and the government’s failure to 
produce minimal evidence on an essential element was fatal, plaintiffs 
would prevail much more often or the government would be forced to 
put forth a meaningful showing of evidence the first time around. 
IV. Implications of Procedural Manipulation 
 The spoken and unspoken deference practices discussed above are 
problematic in and of their own right. Taken together, they defy the 
will of Congress by distorting the standard of review it prescribed and 
effectively endorsing greater government secrecy than was envisioned 
under FOIA.314 As one scholar has persuasively argued with respect to 
extra deference afforded to the military under APA review, departing 
from a congressionally chosen standard of review by the creation of 
common law deference doctrines “is problematic on a deeper level 
than a simple error of statutory interpretation; it represents the courts’ 
failure to respect the democratic process.”315 At bottom, this poses a 
fundamental separation of powers problem, with the judiciary failing to 
give effect to the duly enacted laws of the Congress.316 
 The forms of “unspoken deference” catalogued in this Article have 
especially troubling implications. As demonstrated, altering the typical 
discovery processes, manipulating the summary judgment standard, 
and allowing one litigant special privileges to rehabilitate failed mo-
tions all combine to give the government great advantages. At bottom, 
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these “unspoken deference” practices pose an even greater set of prob-
lems than the spoken deference doctrines in several important ways. 
 Most importantly, some of these entrenched procedural practices 
may consciously or subconsciously have been made because of judges’ 
underlying views about the merits of FOIA as a transparency tool gener-
ally or the merits of the particular FOIA dispute before the court. That 
at least some judges are not fond of FOIA disclosures is not a particu-
larly well-kept secret.317 Indeed, some evidence of this fact can be found 
empirically. Professor Paul Verkuil’s analysis of FOIA outcomes included 
an analysis of so-called reverse FOIA cases, cases in which a third party 
sues the government to prevent release of records to a requester under 
FOIA, typically by claiming that the records are trade secrets.318 Because 
these cases are brought under the APA, the agency’s decision to release 
the records is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, a deferential standard 
that would predict a higher affirmance rate than the affirmance rate for 
FOIA cases.319 Contrary to that prediction, Verkuil finds that the affir-
mance rate in reverse FOIA cases is significantly lower than in tradi-
tional FOIA cases.320 Thus, agencies’ decisions to release documents are 
overturned more often than their decisions not to disclose, which are 
considered under a stricter standard. This finding, although hardly con-
clusive, nonetheless provides some evidence that judges more systemati-
cally defer to secrecy decisions under FOIA. 
 The obfuscation of substantive decision making through the ma-
nipulation of discretionary procedures has been rightly criticized in 
other contexts.321 One scholar has discussed the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
use of “substance disguised as process,” in decisions concerning the 
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Guantanamo detainees.322 In her categorization, “substance disguised 
as process” cases are those in which procedural rulings are “motivated 
by the desire to affect the substantive outcome of the case.”323 This 
scholar contends that the use of procedural dodges to avoid substantive 
decisions concerning the propriety of torture and other war on terror 
tactics secretly subverts substantive law by failing to address the merits 
that motivate the decision.324 As she observes, procedural law itself may 
be “bent” along the way.325 Finally, she notes the lack of candor and 
transparency this represents in the judiciary itself.326 
 Likewise, another scholar has strongly critiqued the discretionary 
decisions made to effectuate substantive preferences in the criminal 
justice system, especially when those substantive preferences subvert the 
expressed will of the legislature.327 He reveals that politicians, the me-
dia, and the public enact changes to the criminal justice system, such as 
sentencing reform, only to have prosecutors rely on discretionary deci-
sions in the use of “low visibility procedures” to undermine these re-
forms.328 This scholar observes that using discretionary procedures to 
affect substantive outcomes impairs legitimacy and trust in the criminal 
justice system, clouds understanding of the substantive law, and pre-
vents the public from meaningfully participating in reform.329 
 The same problems these scholars document in other contexts in 
which procedural maneuvers hide substantive motivations are present 
in FOIA cases. To the extent that the unspoken deference in FOIA 
cases results from underlying views about the merits, it reflects a lack of 
transparency in the judicial decision-making process itself because it 
fails to give notice to the public and the parties of the grounds on 
which the decision really rests.330 In this way, the merits of the case or of 
FOIA disclosure laws themselves will not be debated, reasoned, or ex-
plained, but rather procedural rulings will disguise the difficult is-
sues.331 
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 In addition, a collection of procedural practices, particularly ones 
that purport to apply the generic procedural rules or use case-by-case 
discretion to depart from them, are unlikely to garner the attention or 
effective response on the part of Congress or the public. When the Su-
preme Court decided EPA v. Mink in 1970 and eviscerated any effective 
review of classification claims made under FOIA, Congress acted imme-
diately to restore de novo judicial review.332 Yet when courts use unspo-
ken deference to sanction government secrecy, it is less likely to provoke 
a public debate about the merits of that deference or to prompt legisla-
tive responses. The effect of these practices is simply less clear in the ag-
gregate than a ruling that reflects the substantive effect. Masking these 
substantive motives with procedural rulings is, therefore, normatively 
problematic.333 
 In addition to concerns about secret rulings on the merits of a 
case, distortion of procedural practices in FOIA cases poses other con-
cerns about judicial integrity. The Federal Rules are designed to be 
trans-substantive—that is, with rare exceptions, the same rules apply to 
all cases regardless of the case type.334 A central purpose of trans-
substantivity is to create a sense of fairness to the parties and reliability 
in the litigation system.335 When courts create special procedures for 
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one substantive set of cases, these values are undermined because the 
rules appear to reflect bias and a lack of predictability.336 Furthermore, 
application of the same rules across case type, over time, tends to pro-
duce accurate results, whereas departures from the rules increase risk 
of error in case outcomes.337 Even more alarming, departing from 
trans-substantivity to give the government greater deference than Con-
gress provided in the statute can be seen as judges resolving cases on 
political rather than legal grounds.338 This perception has serious im-
plications for the public’s confidence in the judiciary and view of the 
judiciary’s legitimacy.339 As one scholar put it, “once one starts debating 
which procedures are best for which types of cases, it becomes obvious 
that political decisions are being made.”340 
 All deference to government positions under FOIA contradicts the 
clear terms of the statute and Congress’s express intent in providing for 
de novo judicial review. Unspoken or procedural deference, however, 
poses particularly troubling concerns vis-à-vis the role of the judiciary in 
reviewing agency decisions to withhold records from the public. 
V. Restoring De Novo Review 
 Congress tried not once but twice to ensure de novo judicial review 
to protect the public’s right to access government information under 
FOIA.341 As Judge Patricia Wald said nearly twenty-five years ago, 
If courts had to give traditional deference to agency interpre-
tations of the FOIA, as they do in almost every other review of 
agency action, the Act might have been suffocated in infancy. 
At the least, the Act would not have occupied its present, ma-
jor role in our national lives and governance.342 
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Yet, this deferential review is precisely where the courts have ended up, 
without acknowledging as much. Although courts give lip service to 
FOIA’s de novo review provision, the ninety-percent affirmance rate for 
agency decisions to withhold information under FOIA demonstrates 
that the formal standard does not tell the whole story.343 
 A system of deference to agency secrecy has emerged, comprised 
of circumstances where courts have ignored clear statutory language, 
including express deference doctrines concerning particular exemp-
tion claims and a collection of unique procedural mechanisms in FOIA 
cases that tilt the scale in the government’s favor.344 This deference sys-
tem explains the observed affirmance rate. 
 Ideally, of course, courts would reform their own practices to con-
form to the trans-substantive procedural rules and would treat FOIA 
cases in the same manner as other civil litigation. In addition, they 
would reconsider their practices of spoken deference in light of FOIA’s 
statutory mandate.345 Courts have the power to revisit their assump-
tions about the proper way to review an agency’s decision to withhold 
information from the public and to conclude that their past practices, 
however long-standing, conflict with the statutory language and con-
gressional intent.346 
 Nonetheless, we must recognize that these practices are deeply 
entrenched in FOIA jurisprudence.347 It is therefore worth considering 
strategies litigants in FOIA cases could employ to resist the system of 
deference to the government’s secrecy positions. First, requesters could 
more often seek discovery and litigate their entitlement to it, rather 
than assume its unavailability. Second, requesters faced with the gov-
ernment’s motion for summary judgment should, in their cross-motion 
and opposition, not limit themselves to arguing their own entitlement 
for summary judgment. Rather, they should also argue in the alterna-
tive the inappropriateness of resolution at the summary judgment stage 
by highlighting genuine disputes of material fact appropriately resolved 
at trial.348 Third, requesters should challenge the spoken deference 
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doctrines whenever they arise as contrary to the statute and to congres-
sional intent in enacting FOIA. These types of strategies may force 
courts to view FOIA cases as they view other litigation and make rulings 
more in line with mainstream procedural practices and with the statu-
tory language. 
 Although litigants may be able to advance some of these causes, 
ultimately, courts’ deference to governmental secrecy may require a 
political solution. Congress could approach this problem in several 
ways. The first option is to attempt to clarify the de novo standard by 
articulating specifically a nonexhaustive list of inquiries to which it ap-
plies, legislatively overruling the courts’ spoken deference doctrines. 
For instance, this legislation would specify that courts review de novo all 
inquiries relevant to a claimed exemption, including but not limited to 
the government’s representations about the agency’s decision-making 
process, the potential national security harm that would result from the 
release of records, and the law enforcement purpose for which records 
were compiled.349 With specificity in the language of the statute about 
de novo review applying to these questions, it would be difficult for the 
existing spoken deference doctrines to stand. 
 Perhaps most importantly, Congress could undertake procedural 
reform in FOIA cases. Although not common, Congress occasionally 
does specify departures from the Federal Rules for particular substan-
tive claims as a result of unique problems that arise in specific con-
texts.350 FOIA is an area with specialized litigation difficulties arising 
from the information imbalance between the government and the re-
quester and perhaps warrants a specialized procedural solution.351 One 
reform that would greatly reduce the unspoken deference to the gov-
ernment’s secrecy decisions includes guaranteeing the availability of 
some minimal amount of discovery prior to summary judgment mo-
tions, such as one set of interrogatories and a single deposition. Giving 
the requester the opportunity to examine a government official famil-
iar with the records at issue would permit the requester to test genu-
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inely, and perhaps contest, the government’s claims.352 Another power-
ful procedural reform would be to allow the government a single op-
portunity for a summary judgment motion, requiring the court either 
to grant summary judgment to the plaintiff if the government fails to 
produce sufficient evidence to allow the trier of fact to find in its favor, 
or to order the case to trial if there exists a genuine dispute of material 
fact. Disallowing do-overs for the government would compel the gov-
ernment to put forth its best case the first time around, allow the court 
to make a ruling based on the best available evidence, and shorten the 
litigation process for all involved.353 
Conclusion 
 Taken together, courts, litigants, and Congress should consider 
their role in remedying the system of deference to secrecy. This system 
of deference raises troubling questions about whether decision making 
has suffered at the administrative level under FOIA in reaction to a lack 
of meaningful judicial review. It also raises concerns that Congress’s de-
sire for a true judicial remedy for aggrieved requesters is not available in 
practice. The courts in particular should consider the effect of using 
procedural mechanisms to effectuate particular substantive outcomes: 
hiding the nature of the decision-making process, preventing a mean-
ingful political response, and creating distrust of the judiciary. These 
serious concerns warrant consideration of FOIA reform for all involved. 
 
352 See Kwoka, supra note 146, at 273–76. 
353 See supra notes 290–313 and accompanying text. 
